01005749 Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC E313 other parts of the country.431 For this reason, it was CHHOUK Rin’s belief that the evacuations were executed based upon an agreement among the leaders.432 149. Several witnesses confirmed that instructions from higher levels were relayed downwards through the ranks of the RAK. Witness KHORN Brak stated before the Co-Investigating Judges that there was a meeting three days before the attack on Phnom Penh where troops were told that they had to evacuate the city after it was liberated, and tell LON Nol soldiers to put down their weapons. 433 CHHAOM Se stated that orders to evacuate Phnom Penh were blanket orders carried out in every battlefield as every city had to be emptied of their inhabitants in accordance with a plan established in advance.434 Two Khmer Rouge soldiers at the time of Phnom Penh’s liberation, CHEA Say and SUM Chea, received orders to help evacuate people from the city, but only after Phnom Penh was liberated.435 Similarly, KUNG Kim only became aware of the plan to evacuate when he entered Phnom Penh with his platoon and noticed people were on the move. His platoon had orders to cut the water supply to force people to leave their houses, or to enter houses if people remained inside, to ensure that people had been evacuated from their area, and to clean the houses or the roads.436 The uniformity of these orders indicates that there was a coordinated plan at the outset.437 431 T. 22 April 2013 (CHHOUK Rin) pp. 89-94. T. 22 April 2013 (CHHOUK Rin) pp. 89-94. 433 KHORN Brak Interview Record, E3/509, 8 January 2009, pp. 2-3, ERN (En) 00282215-16; THA Sot Interview Record, E3/464, 19 January 2008, p. 3, ERN (En) 00226108 (received orders from his chief to evacuate people although unclear as to when). 434 T. 11 January 2013 (CHHAOM Se), p. 59; T. 8 April 2013 (CHHAOM Se), pp. 34, 66. 435 T. 20 September 2012 (CHEA Say), p. 44-45 (a soldier at the time of Phnom Penh’s liberation, testified he was ordered by his commander to help evacuate people from the city after Phnom Penh was liberated); T. 5 November 2012 (SUM Chea), pp. 7, 10-11 (a Khmer Rouge soldier in 1972, stated that his division received orders from the head of the battalion, Hak, to evacuate people from Phnom Penh, although he did not know from whom Hak received his orders). See also, SAU Ren DC-CAM Statement, E3/2073, 24 January 2003, ERN (En) 00876404-05 (received his orders from his deputy chief of regiment); Report of the Execution of Rogatory Letter, E3/3885, 20 March 2008, pp. 3-4, ERN (En) 00205123-24 (HIM Han’s unit commander held a meeting informing them of instructions to evacuate seven day after Phnom Penh fell). See also, PRAK Yoeun Interview Record, E3/471, p. 3, ERN (En) 00223335. 436 T. 24 October 2012 (KUNG Kim), pp. 90-91, 101; T. 25 October 2012 (KUNG Kim), pp. 18-21, 53, 57-58. 437 See also, SRENG Thi Interview Record, E3/5263, 6 January 2009, p. 3, ERN (En) 00282224 (“a half-month before 17 April 1975, when my unit […] approached close to Phnom Penh, Soeun, my battalion commander, told me and the other combatants in the unit that they had to evacuate all the people form Phnom Penh (he [did] not say anything beyond that) until things were back to normal and they could return”); SEM Hoeun Interview Record, E3/5280, 10 March 2009, p. 3, ERN (En) 432 Case 002/01, Judgement, 7 August 2014 - Public 82