A/HRC/25/60 information tainted by torture or other ill-treatment involving countries with a poor human rights record condones torture or ill-treatment, makes it less likely that a State concerned speaks out against such practices and leads to State responsibility for complicity in torture and in the commission of internationally wrongful acts. In other cases 56. In cases where there is no record of “systematic” torture, State responsibility is triggered if the State that collects, shares or receives the information knew or ought to have known that there was a real risk that it could lead to or was acquired through impermissible means in another State. Due diligence in making such a determination should be demanded from States that rely on information not gathered by its own agents. By accepting the information without investigating or questioning the manner in which it was extracted, the receiving State inevitably implies the “recognition of lawfulness” of such practices, even if the information is obtained only for operational purposes, and aids and assists the torturing State in maintaining impunity for the acts of torture.51 Even by receiving torture-tainted information once the receiving State does in fact encourage information from agencies that pursue investigations in violation of the framework of international human rights law. It creates a demand for torture-tainted information and elevates its operational use to a policy. In order to avoid complicity, executive agencies must assess the situation and rule out the existence of such a risk before interacting with foreign States. After-the-fact, acceptance and use of information likely obtained by torture or other ill-treatment constitute implicit recognition of the situation created by the torture or ill-treatment as lawful since it treats the information no differently than legally-obtained information.52 Assurances 57. The invocation of “assurances” as a means to eliminate possible risk of torture or other ill-treatment are of great concern. In the context of the non-refoulement provision, the Special Rapporteur, the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee have found that assurances from foreign services do not relieve the sending State from its responsibilities to prevent torture. Similarly, assurances by providers of information that torture or other ill-treatment was not involved in producing it are not sufficient to permit cooperation where a real risk is identified.53 Promises of humane treatment given by governments that practice torture or ill-treatment are not reliable and do not provide an effective safeguard against the real risk of acts of torture or other ill-treatment on return. States that engage in torture or ill-treatment routinely deny and conceal its use and it is therefore difficult if not impossible for executive agencies to verify whether assurances are truthful. In addition, assurances are not legally binding or enforceable; and States concerned are unlikely to follow-up on assurances provided since verifying and acknowledging that the abuse has occurred means an admission for both countries that they are responsible for violations of the prohibition of torture. 58. While such findings have been made in the particular context of international transfers of detainees, the reasoning applies with equal force to collecting, sharing and receiving information by executive agencies and to the States’ obligation to prevent and discourage torture and other ill-treatment. 51 52 53 A/HRC/10/3, para. 55; M. Pollard, op cit., at 376 Ibit., at 377 A/59/324, para. 31; A/60/316, para. 51; Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Comm DH (2004) 13, para.19 15