“Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties.” 151. It then has to be considered by what means it may be possible to give effect in our law to this moral imperative. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that it may be done by accepting that the principles of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“UNCAT”) form part of our law, by resort to article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) or by regarding it as a valid principle of the common law. I do not find it necessary to explore either of the first two avenues, which are not without their difficulties, for I am satisfied that the common law can accommodate the principles involved. 152. Some of your Lordships have expressed the opinion that the common law as it stands would forbid the reception in evidence of any statement obtained by the use of torture: see the opinions of my noble and learned friends Lord Bingham of Cornhill at para 52 and Lord Hope of Craighead at para 112. This view may well be justified historically, but even if it requires some extension of the common law I am of the clear opinion that the principle can be accommodated. We have long ceased to give credence to the fiction that the common law consists of a number of pre-ordained rules which merely require discovery and judicial enunciation. Two centuries ago Lord Kenyon recognised that in being formed from time to time by the wisdom of man it grew and increased from time to time wi th the wisdom of mankind: R v Lord Rusby (1800) Pea (2) 189 at 192. Sir Frederick Pollock referred in 1890 in his Oxford Lectures, p 111 to the “freshly growing fabric of the common law” and McCardie J spoke in Prager v Blatspiel, Stamp and Heacock Ltd [1924] 1 KB 566 at 570 of the demand of an expanding society for an expanding common law. Similarly, in the US Supreme Court 121 years ago Matthews J said in Hurtado v California (1884) 110 US 516 at 531 that “as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new -81-