CCPR/C/123/D/2189/2012 9.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that his extradition from the Russian Federation to Uzbekistan would expose him to the risk of torture, contrary to article 7 of the Covenant. 9.3 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 10 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.11 In making this assessment, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin. 12 The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence, according to which considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party13 and that it is generally for the organs of States parties to the Covenant to review or evaluate the facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.14 9.4 The Committee observes that the author’s claims that he would be subjected to torture if extradited to Uzbekistan were examined by the State party’s Federal Migration Service in the course of the proceedings on refugee status determination and by the State party’s courts in the course of the extradition proceedings, both of which found that he had not substantiated his claim that he would face a real, foreseeable and personal risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Uzbekistan. The Committee also notes that the author’s fear of being subjected to torture relates to the alleged threats directed against his brother for having criticized the Uzbek authorities in 2009 and 2011 and to the general human rights situation in his country of origin, rather than to his specific case. The Committee notes that the author has not disputed that before his arrest on extradition charges in Moscow in 2011, he travelled freely back and forth between the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan on several occasions without encountering any issues with the Uzbek authorities, for instance while crossing the Uzbek border. The Committee also notes that, according to the information on file, the author and his brother were prosecuted on fraudrelated charges in Uzbekistan, while nothing points to a political motivation for those charges. The Committee also notes the absence of any evidence that the decisions of the State party’s authorities were manifestly unreasonable with respect to the allegations of the author. In the light of the above, the Committee cannot conclude that the information before it shows that the author’s extradition to Uzbekistan exposed him to a real risk of inhuman treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant. 9.5 The Committee further notes the author’s claim contained in his subsequent submission of 19 August 2012, to the effect that his detention pending extradition after 7 December 2011 was in violation of article 9 of the Covenant. The Committee notes the author’s claim that he was continuously detained for over 10 months before his extradition. It also notes his claim that the extradition request was not submitted by Uzbekistan within the required time frame under the applicable legislation and that therefore his detention was against the law. The Committee also notes that the State party has not replied to those particular claims. 9.6 The Committee refers to its general comment No. 35 on liberty and security of person, in which it recalled that article 9 of the Covenant required that procedures for carrying out legally authorized deprivation of liberty should also be established by law and States parties should ensure compliance with their legally prescribed procedures (para. 23). 10 11 12 13 14 8 See, for example, X. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2. See, for example, X. v. Denmark, para. 9.2, and X. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. Ibid. See, for example, Lin v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3, and E.P. and F.P. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/115/D/2344/2014), para. 8.4. See, for example, E.P. and F.P. v. Denmark, para. 8.4.