JUSTICE FOR ALL domestic level but also to add protective provisions. However, the research showed that some countries did not take the opportunity of the transposition to create better protections despite the existence of certain CJEU jurisprudence already highlighting the issue of forcing persons with intellectual and/ or psychosocial disabilities to go through cross-border proceedings. Concerning the EAW FD, a major point of contention within the EAW proceedings is that of postponement and the absence of any possibility to refuse the surrender. The need for such a possibility was highlighted in the E.D.L. case at the CJEU.399 Slovenia400 and Bulgaria,401 for their parts, have not identified any transposed provision adding this option, but only that health reasons could be invoked to push the date of the transfer as found in Art 23 EAW FD. Slovenia stressed that, although postponements have been observed, this would not affect the decision on the transfer in any case.402 Lithuania added that the application for postponement could only be made by the prosecutor and not by the defence.403 Finally, as can be seen in the comparative tables on transposition laws (see Section 4), Bulgaria’s domestic legislation does not even contain a provision on fundamental rights. The comparative tables revealed that the TP FD, contrary to the EAW FD, was not transposed with a focus on fundamental rights despite the fact that both FDs involve a transit. Only Austria,404 Slovenia405 and Lithuania406 included a provision at their domestic level on possible refusal to execute the FD because of fundamental rights violations. Italy, for its part, only recognises the possibility to postpone and not to refuse the execution of the FD in cases of fundamental rights violations. 4.2.2.2 NO ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS Among the additional provisions that could have been found in the national transpositions of the four FDs, the research shows an absence of procedural safeguards. Concerning the EAW FD, Lithuania pointed out that the mandatory presence of a legal representative is foreseen in cases where Lithuania is the executing State but not the issuing State.407 Slovenia also reported that, during the EAW proceedings, the defendant did not have the right to a person of trust to be present, or that there are no guidelines on the obligation to record hearings involving persons with intellectual and/or psychosocial disabilities.408 Although the recording of interviews is quite common, the decision to do so remains with the investigating judge. 4.2.2.3 NO ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS TO PROTECT PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND/OR PSYCHOSOCIAL DISABILITIES It was found that States did not add protective provisions at the domestic level applying to persons with intellectual and/or psychosocial disabilities in cross-border proceedings. Regarding the EAW FD, there is a general absence of protective provisions in domestic legislations and a missed opportunity concerning transposition laws. This was notably pointed out by Bulgaria409 and Slovenia.410 Lithuania evoked a situation whereby a defendant in a vulnerable state sees their needs assessed and from such assessment safeguards can be applied. However, this decision depends entirely on the actors involved as there is also a lack of specialised guidelines.411 Slovenia also stressed how judges and prosecutors would only rely on the information found in the EAW notice by the executing authority, which means that if a person with intellectual and/or psychosocial disabilities has not been assessed before arriving on Slovenian territory, they will not be upon arrival.412 Defendants in a vulnerable situation will therefore end up following the same proceedings as the rest of the defendants and only go through psychiatric examination once admitted to a detention facility. Such difficulties were highlighted during the consultation workshop with prosecutors, where an Italian judge evoked the unsuitable nature of the EAW as a legal basis when it involved a person with an intellectual and/or psychosocial disability, going as far as stating that there should be a presumption of a fundamental rights breach in this case. 97