CCPR/C/130/D/2818/2016 another procedure of international investigation or settlement, unless there are reasons justifying the delay, taking into account all the circumstances of the communication. In the author’s case, the communication was submitted less than three years after the issuance of the decision of inadmissibility of the European Court of Human Rights on 28 March 2013. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the communication does not represent an abuse of the right of submission. 6.5 The Committee notes the author’s claims under article 2 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which article 2 of the Covenant may be invoked by individuals only in conjunction with other articles of the Covenant and cannot, in and of itself, give rise to a claim under the Optional Protocol.5 Accordingly, the Committee declares the author’s claim under article 2 of the Covenant inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 6.6 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the communication is inadmissible because the arguments advanced by the author are of a general nature. The Committee takes note of the author’s claims under articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant concerning the conditions of his solitary confinement and also notes the author’s claims under article 14 (1)–(2), read in conjunction with article 26, of the Covenant, to the effect that his conviction was based on biased media articles and the prejudicial risk assessment report of the police, which indicated discriminatory attitudes towards him on account of his Lithuanian nationality. The Committee further notes the author’s claims under articles 14 (3) (a)–(b) and (g) and 14 (5) of the Covenant, to the effect that he did not have adequate facilities to prepare his defence, did not have access to unspecified case materials during the criminal trial, was forced to testify against himself and did not have access to an effective appeal procedure. The Committee takes note, however, of the detailed submission of the State party according to which the author’s conviction was based not on his nationality but on the evidence, which was comprehensively assessed by the Reykjanes District Court and the Supreme Court. Further, the Committee notes the explanations provided by the State party regarding the facilities afforded to the author and the fact that the author succeeded in part on appeal. In the light of these explanations, and in the absence of any further details from the author, the Committee considers that the author has not sufficiently substantiated these claims for the purpose of admissibility and therefore finds them inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.7 The Committee considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated the claims under article 9 of the Covenant for the purposes of admissibility. It therefore declares them admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that the State party violated his rights under article 9 of the Covenant by holding him in prolonged solitary confinement for 32 days during pretrial detention. The Committee observes that article 9 (1) of the Covenant prohibits both arbitrary and unlawful deprivations of liberty. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 35 (2014), in accordance with which deprivations of liberty include solitary confinement.6 The Committee notes that the author was held in solitary confinement for 30 days, from 18 October to 17 November 2009. The Committee observes that, as recognized by the Supreme Court in its decision dated 17 November 2009, domestic law applicable at that time prohibited solitary confinement for more than four weeks (i.e., 28 days) for crimes punishable by less than 10 years of imprisonment, including human trafficking. The Committee also notes the severity of solitary confinement as a form of punishment and takes note of the absence of a detailed and specific explanation by the State party, beyond references to domestic law, as to why the author’s solitary confinement was necessary. The 5 6 10 See, inter alia, A.P. v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/105/D/1834/2008), para. 8.5. General comment No. 35 (2014), para. 5.