CCPR/C/117/D/2443/2014 author’s son that the Danish Immigration Service accepted his statement as fact and concluded that it could not be ruled out that he had become of interest to the authorities because of his activities. 4.3 In connection with the summonses submitted to the Committee and the contention that the authorities were still pursuing the author, the State party challenges the author’s counsel’s statement that the Refugee Appeals Board has not taken into consideration the fact that although the Danish Immigration Service had the authenticity of the summonses assessed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their authenticity could not be established with certainty. The State party observes that the Service did not request an assessment of the authenticity of the summonses through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State party also observes that the author’s counsel submitted that the author’s medical records5 did not indicate that she had been tortured but that she was a poor sleeper, that she suffered from nightmares and headaches, that she was worried and that she wanted to see a psychologist. Accordingly, the Danish authorities did not examine the author for signs of torture, despite the consent granted by the author for such an examination to be carried out. 4.4 The State party submits that the author has failed to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility under article 7 of the Covenant. It considers that the author has not established that there were substantial grounds for believing that she would be in danger of being tortured in the Russian Federation. The State party therefore considers that part of the communication inadmissible. As to the claim of a violation of article 9 of the Covenant, the State party observes that the author’s counsel has only asserted that returning the author to the Russian Federation would violate this provision, without establishing how the author risks treatment contrary to article 9. The State party is not aware of any findings made by the Committee that article 9 of the Covenant can be deemed to have extraterritorial effect. It also refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 17 January 2012 in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom,6 concerning article 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), which is similar to article 9 of the Covenant. With respect to article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the crucial factor when assessing whether that provision can be deemed to have extraterritorial effect hence is whether there is a real risk of a flagrant breach of that article, and a high threshold applies. For these reasons, and because the author has not sufficiently substantiated that there are substantial grounds for believing that her rights in this regard will be violated in the Russian Federation, the State party submits that the author has failed to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility under article 9 of the Covenant. 5 6 4 Medical records were not part of the submission. There is no further information on such records. It is not clear, but it appears that the medical records referred to in paragraph 4.3 were produced within the State party. (In an e-mail dated 17 July 2014 addressed to the Committee, the counsel refers to “the author’s medical journal from Denmark”.) Paragraph 233 of the judgment reads: The Court therefore considers that, despite the doubts it expressed in Tomic, it is possible for Article 5 to apply in an expulsion case. Hence, the Court considers that a Contracting State would be in violation of Article 5 if it removed an applicant to a State where he or she was at real risk of a flagrant breach of that Article. However, as with Article 6, a high threshold must apply. A flagrant breach of Article 5 would occur only if, for example, the receiving State arbitrarily detained an applicant for many years without any intention of bringing him or her to trial. A flagrant breach of Article 5 might also occur if an applicant would be at risk of being imprisoned for a substantial period in the receiving State, having previously been convicted after a flagrantly unfair trial.