implementation a priority. Moreover, executive ministries frequently lack established frameworks for communication and cooperation. Implementation, particularly in complex cases, engages the competencies of multiple agencies and departments, but their joint efforts are too often characterized by disorganization and delay. A second and related problem is that of political will to implement. Political will is essential, but it is not something that can be summoned just by invoking it; it has to be nurtured, and building domestic structures can facilitate that process. At the same time, it is important that the mere presence of the mechanisms I just mentioned not be mistaken for political will. As the report demonstrates, a state can have the most sophisticated structures at its disposal but without a genuine commitment by key political actors to implementation, their promise will remain illusory. The appearance of compliance is not the same as actual compliance, even though many governments may try to make us think that they are. Implementation at the Domestic Level I am going to now turn from the international scene and say a few words about the national level, since after all, it is states that are responsible for implementing these decisions. The Justice Initiative will soon be publishing a follow-up report to “From Judgment to Justice” that looks particularly at the way in which states go about executing international decisions at the national level. The report, called “From Rights to Remedies,” examines what sort of frameworks, structures, and mechanisms exist at the national level to facilitate (or thwart) implementation.31 Three overall conclusions inform the report’s findings. First, despite the large number of states that have accepted the jurisdiction of international courts and treaty-bodies, the domestic infrastructure needed to ensure implementation of their decisions remains very underdeveloped. On the positive side, attention to domestic implementation structures has gained increasing ground in a number of different regional systems. Indeed, improved implementation is a key pillar of ongoing reform efforts for the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers—the political body that oversees implementation—has recommended that Member States design a range of mechanisms to ensure efficient domestic capacity for the execution of Strasbourg judgments. Some states have sought to develop such mechanisms as well, including the formation of high-level inter-ministerial committees and working groups, the establishment of standing parliamentary human rights committees, focal points for implementation within the executive branch, the passage of enabling legislation, and direct enforcement through national court systems in some cases. Lastly—and I commend CAT’s General Comment 3 in this regard; it really hits the nail on the head—when thinking about implementation, we need to focus on the multiple organs within a state, not just the executive but the legislature and the judiciary as well. Implementation involves disparate state actors who operate in different institutional settings and often have different or competing political interests, yet too often discussions are confined to the level of the executive alone. Such disagreements are not an excuse for noncompliance, but a crucial recommendation of the report is the need for states to better structure the multiple points at which implementation occurs and for advocates to think strategically about where pressure can best be applied. No one is better placed to do this than the activists and organizations who work on human rights at the national level, as they are the ones who understand the political situations and structures of their country best. Unfortunately, these approaches remain the exception to what is otherwise an ad hoc process, managed largely by midlevel bureaucrats who lack sufficient political authority to make Remarks of Elsy Chemurgor Sainna* Introduction M y presentation is based on implementing the UN Convention against Torture in Kenya,32 and, from the outset, I must begin by mentioning that Kenya is not a State Party to the Optional Protocol,33 which means we cannot bring cases before the Committee against Torture. But, with that said, there are other ways in which we are trying to promote the fight against torture in Kenya. Before I embark on my remarks, I want to tell you a little bit about the International Commission * Elsy Chemurgor Sainna represented the International Commission of Jurists, Kenyan Chapter. Currently, she is a Fellow with the Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) Program at the Georgetown University Law Center. 29