CAT/C/41/D/291/2006 page 16 meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol”.29 In the present case, it is certain that this three-year limit set by the Human Rights Committee will be exceeded, since the investigation by the Tunisian authorities is still in its preliminary phase. The complainant reiterates that the State party’s failure to launch an investigation for 23 months constitutes a violation of article 12 of the Convention.30 7.3 According to the complainant, given the persistent refusal by the State party to comment on the merits of the complaint, the Committee should base its decision on the facts as she describes them. The Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture have consistently maintained that due weight must be given to a complainant’s allegations if the State party fails to provide any contradictory evidence or explanation.31 The complainant reiterates that, in her case, the State party has not expressed any view on the merits; the complainant, however, has correctly proceeded to substantiate her allegations with a number of documents, including copies of her medical records, her complaint to the Tunisian judicial authorities, witness statements and a large amount of supplementary documentation. She considers therefore that the Committee should base its decision on the facts as described by her. As to the State party’s claim that it cannot comment on the merits of the complaint as long as the internal investigation is ongoing, the complainant argues that responsibility for both the delay in instigating the internal procedure and the delay pending its conclusion lies with the State party, as it did not take any action for two years and finally acted only when her complaint was submitted to the Committee. The unreasonable delay in the internal procedure as a result of the State party’s failure to act should not detract from the complainant’s case to the Committee. To allow it to do so would be to do wrong both to the complainant and to the cause of justice. 7.4 According to the complainant, the State party has not been able to demonstrate that remedies are effectively available to victims in Tunisia. She points out that, under the rules of international law, the Committee considers “effective” only those remedies available to the victim not only in theory but also in practice.32 She argues that the judicial system in Tunisia is not independent and the courts generally endorse the Government’s decisions. In situations where it has been clearly demonstrated that access to the courts is denied to individuals like the complainant, the burden of proof is on the State party to prove the contrary. In the present case, 29 Communication No. 336/1988, Fillastre and Bizouarn v. Bolivia, Views adopted on 5 November 1991, para. 5.2. 30 Communication No. 8/1991, Halimi-Nedzibi v. Austria, Views adopted on 18 November 1993. 31 The complainant refers to the Views of the Human Rights Committee on the following communications: No. 1353/2005, Njaru v. Cameroon, Views adopted on 19 March 2007; No. 1208/2003, Kurbonov v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 16 March 2006; and No. 760/1997, Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, Views adopted on 25 July 2000. 32 The complainant refers to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (communication No. 147/1983, Arzuada Gilboa v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 1 November 1985).