Fulfilling performance quotas 63. There is reason to believe that performance indicators requiring police and prosecutors to meet quotas or targets for arrests, prosecutions and convictions incentivize the use of torture. Failure to fulfil quotas can result in a range of consequences, from being forced to work less-desirable jobs, to pay cuts and even job loss, which may incentivize officials to fulfil targets by any means, including torture. In one Central Asian OSCE participating State, for instance, suspects are reportedly more likely to be tortured at the end of the month, when police are attempting to meet monthly performance quotas.143 While quotas for criminal justice officials remain a largely unreported aspect of the operation of criminal justice systems in the OSCE region, there are indications that some OSCE countries use quotas on either a formal or informal basis. Police 64. Police quotas were a distinct and formal feature of the justice system in the Soviet Union and, as such, have been studied extensively in post-Soviet states. The system is referred to as the “cane” or “stick” system, whereby officers or units are punished for failing to reach specific numerical arrest targets for different categories of crime. An article from 2012 described how this system continued to operate: “Police units today receive from the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] a monthly work plan compiled along quantitative parameters, which includes quotas for prosecuting hooligans, illegal immigrants, and other types of criminals. In 2009, for example, one police district received a plan with quotas for 72 different types of potential crime. Failure on the part of a district as a whole to meet the quotas would mean that no individual employee from the district would receive a pay raise at the end of the quarter. Essentially, the Russian police force is evaluated on the basis of whether it is able to meet the quarterly plans, while no record is kept on the police’s achievements in crime prevention.”144 143 Richard Carver & Lisa Handley (eds), op. cit., note 13, p.572 (example of Kyrgyzstan). 144 Boris Gladarev, “Russian Police before the 2010–2011 Reform: A Police Officer’s Perspective”, 45