abolished.165 Acquittals can still constitute informal grounds for prosecutors to receive reprimands, meaning that they will not receive a bonus, which can represent 40 per cent of their earnings, for the next 6 months.166 According to the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission): “It seems that because of fear of performance indicators and of disciplinary proceedings prosecutors exert pressure on the judges to avoid acquittals.”167 74. States should not use targets measuring conviction rates or favouring high conviction rates, because this conflicts with the goal of upholding the prohibition of torture and the use of torture tainted evidence, as well as fair trial rights. Such targets actively disincentivize prosecutors from ensuring that confessions or plea bargains have not been obtained through the use of torture, as any finding that these had been obtained in this manner would inevitably have an impact on the admissibility of evidence, the fairness of the trial and whether the defendant is convicted. As outlined in the preceding sections, prosecutors should play an important role in ensuring evidence has been obtained lawfully and in initiating investigations into any allegations of torture. 75. In the surveys disseminated for this paper, respondents were asked to rate the independence of judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers. Prosecutors were ranked as less independent than judges or defence lawyers in the majority of responses. In two cases, prosecutorial independence was ranked with the lowest possible score.168 76. A recent report published by the National Prosecutors Office of one Eastern European OSCE participating State suggests that the number of acquittals is an important indicator in assessing workplace performance.169 Of the other countries surveyed through the questionnaire to CSOs, it was reported that in at least two other OSCE participating States performance indicators for prosecutors are used.170 It should be noted that, in general terms there is a difference between assessing prosecutorial performance by taking into account conviction rates, 165 Yuriy Belousov, ”Чому в Україні не виносять виправдувальні вироки?”, [Why aren’t acquittals handed down in Ukraine?] (2016); Halya Coynash, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, ”Why Ukraine acquits 10 times less often than in Stalin’s Soviet Union”, (2016). 166 Questionnaire response Ukraine Without Torture (2019). 167 Venice Commission, “Joint Opinion on the Draft Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine”, CDL-AD(2013)025 para. 128. 168 Questionnaire responses from Promo Lex Association (Moldova) and Human Rights Association (Turkey) (2019). 169 Questionnaire response Poland Helsinki Committee (2019). 170 Questionnaire responses from Armenia Helsinki Association and Public Verdict Foundation (Russia) (2019). 49