CDL-AD(2006)009 - 28 - engaged unless it can be proved that the authorities of the State to which the applicant has been transferred have acted extra-territorially and without consent, and consequently in a manner that is inconsistent with the sovereignty of the host State76. 118. Any form of involvement of the Council of Europe member State or receipt of information prior to the arrest taking place entails responsibility under Articles 1 and 5 ECHR (and possibly Article 3 in respect of the modalities of the arrest). A State must thus prevent the arrest from taking place, unless the arrest is effected by the foreign authorities in the exercise of their jurisdiction under the terms of an applicable SOFA (see footnote 68 above). 119. The responsibility of the Council of Europe member States is engaged also in the case that some section of its public authorities (police, security forces etc.) has co-operated with the foreign authorities or has not prevented an arrest without government knowledge. This situation raises the question of governmental control over the security/police services, and possibly, if the applicable national law so foresees, of parliamentary control over the government. 120. Different European States exercise different systems for political insight into, and control over, the operations of the security and intelligence services, depending upon constitutional structure, historical factors etc. Different mechanisms exist for ensuring that particularly sensitive operations are subject to approval and/or adequate control. Meaningful government accountability to the legislature is obviously conditioned upon meaningful governmental control over the security and intelligence services77. Where the law provides for governmental control, but this control does not exist in practice, the security and intelligence services risk becoming a “State within a State”. Where, on the other hand, the law provides for a degree of distance between government ministers and officials and the day-to-day operations of the security and intelligence services, but government ministers in fact exercise influence or even control over these operations, then the phenomenon of “deniability” can arise. In such a case, the exercise of power is concealed, and there is no proper accountability. The Statute of the Council of Europe and the ECHR require respect for the rule of law which in turn requires accountability for all exercises of public power. Independently of how a State chooses to regulate political control over security and intelligence agencies, in any case effective oversight and control mechanisms must exist to avoid these two problems.78 B. Council of Europe member States’ obligations in respect of alleged secret detention facilities 121. The term “secrecy” can have different meanings. In the context of the present opinion, the problematic aspect of the secrecy of detention lies in the first place in the impact which such 76 European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan v. Turkey judgment, § 90. 77 Internal Security Services In Europe, Report adopted by the Venice Commission at its 34th Plenary meeting, 7 March 1998CDL-INF(1998)006e) 78 European Court of Human Rights, Klass and others v. Federal Republic of Germany judgment of 6 September 1978, § 75 in connection with § 71; Leander v. Sweden judgment of 26 March 1987, § 84.