CDL-AD(2006)009 - 32 - 139. In this context, it is worth underlining that Council of Europe member States are under an obligation to prevent prisoners’ exposure to the risk of torture: the violation does not depend on whether the prisoner is eventually subjected to torture. 140. The assessment of the reality of the risk must be carried out very rigorously. The risk assessment will depend upon the circumstances, meaning both the rights which risk being violated and the situation in the receiving State. The diplomatic assurances which are usually provided by the requesting State in order to exclude human rights breaches in its territory after the extradition or deportation is carried out may be appropriate as concerns risks of application of the death penalty86 or for fair trial violations, because such risks can in most instances be monitored satisfactorily. On the other hand, as regards the risk of torture, monitoring is impracticable in the vast majority of conceivable cases, especially bearing in mind the fact that, even after conviction in a criminal case, a State may torture a prisoner for the purpose of obtaining information. At the same time, it is impracticable to have a “life-long” responsibility for people who are removed out of the country. 141. This situation raises the question of the value of diplomatic assurances87. In the Venice Commission’s view, the acceptance of such assurances is in principle the expression of the necessary good faith and mutual trust between friendly States, although, as far as assurances may be regarded as acceptable in principle (see para. 142 below), the terms of the diplomatic assurances need to be unequivocal (for instance, a reference to “torture” or to “inhuman or degrading treatment” should be interpreted within the meaning given to these terms by the ECtHR, the CAT and the HR Committee) and need to reflect the scope of the obligation by which the State which issues them is legally bound. 142. However, this general mutual trust must not prevail over the accurate examination of each specific situation, particularly if there are precedents or even patterns of violation of previously accepted assurances88. For example, an important difference between the situation in the Mamatkulov case (see para. 71 above) and later ones is that recent experience has shown that the risk of torture seems to be greater than what was known before, despite assurances. In the Commission’s view, under these circumstances the room for accepting guarantees against torture is reduced significantly. Where there is substantial evidence that a country practices or permits torture in respect of certain categories of prisoners, guarantees may not satisfactorily reduce this risk in cases of requests for extradition of prisoners belonging to those categories. 143. The requirement of not exposing any prisoner to the real risk of ill-treatment also applies in respect of the transit of prisoners through the territory of Council of Europe member States: member States should therefore refuse to allow transit of prisoners in circumstances where there is such a risk. 86 And is indeed required: see European Court of Human Rights, Nivette v. France judgment of 3 July 2001, in which the European Court of Human Rights found that extradition to a State imposing the death sentence violated Protocol 6. 87 The Council of Europe Steering Committee on Human Rights (CDDH) has set up a Group of Specialists with the task of “reflection on the issues raised with regard to human rights by the use of diplomatic assurances in the context of expulsion procedures; and consider the appropriateness of a legal instrument, for example a recommendation on minimum requirements/standards of such diplomatic assurances, and, if need be, present concrete proposals”. 88 See European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, 15th General Report on the CPT’s activities, §§39-40, at http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-15.htm.