8.5 The State party furthermore refers to a series of Canadian court decisions on the nature and effects of parole, its suspension or revocation. It also argues, quoting various authorities, that the Canadian process of sentencing permits flexibility with respect to forfeiture of parole. It points out that the last sentence of three years (plus forfaiture of parole) when the statutory maximum is 14 years, makes it possible to argue, in view of Mr. Van Duzen's criminal record, that the judge did take into consideration his forfeiture of parole. Also the role of the National Parole Board is discussed in this context. 8.6 The State party agrees with the alleged principle of interpretation referred to in paragraph 6.2 above, but is unable to find any ambiguity in article 15 of the Cov­ enant because it is clearly restricted, it submits, to the field of criminal law. Therefore, the State party sub­ mits, the author cannot benefit from the presumption in favour of liberty. 8.7 In the light of the above, the State party submits that the Human Rights Committee ought to dismiss Mr. Van Duzen's communication. Article 15, it sub­ mits, deals with criminal penalties, while the process of parole is purely administrative, and therefore the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1977 cannot be regarded as providing a hghter penalty within the ambit of ar­ ticle 15. 9.1 On 2 June 1981 the author through his represen­ tative submitted observations under rule 93 (3) of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure in response to the State party's submission of 18 February 1981 under article 4 (2) of the Optional Protocol. 9.2 The author observes that in article 15 (1) the word "criminal" is associated with "offence" and not with "penalty". The State party's attempt to narrow the meaning of "penahy" is not supported by the words of the article. It is submitted that if the offence is criminal within the meaning of the article, any penalty for the of­ fence is a penalty within the meaning of the article. The State party admits that forfeiture and revocation of parole were penalties and that revocation continues to be a penalty, but tries to divide penalties into categories for which it has no authority in the words of the article, in precedent or in reason. direction and control of the Commissioner of Correc­ tions. 9.5 As the Government has emphasized, the author states, parole affects the mode of undergoing a sentence of imprisonment imposed for the offence. Forfeiture and revocation of parole were, before 15 October 1977, penalties for breach of conditions of parole. Revocation of parole continues to be such a penalty. The State par­ ty's argument is that a penalty within the meaning of article 15 (1) is only a so-called "criminal penalty" im­ posed by a criminal court for a particular criminal of­ fence, pursuant to criminal proceedings. It must surely be agreed that a term of imprisonment is such a penalty. A penalty is not exhausted when it is pronounced. It continues in operation until it has been completely ex­ ecuted. Being at large on parole is therefore a mode of undergoing a criminal penalty. Forfeiture and revoca­ tion of parole and their consequences were penalties for breach of conditions of a mode of undergoing a criminal penalty. Even if the State party's definition of "penahy" whhin the meaning of article 15 (1) were cor­ rect, which is not admitted, forfeiture and revocation of parole would be criminal penalties whhin that inter­ pretation of the article. The attempted distinction put foward by the Government between an administrative and a criminal penalty is without foundation in this con­ text. In this connection, attention is drawn to the state­ ment of Mr. Justice LeDain, in the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, in his reasons for judgement in Re Zong and Commissioner of Penitentiaries (1976) 1 C.F. 657, at 679-80, cited in the reply, where he said that forfeiture of parole was a penalty for the act of commit­ ting an indictable offence while on parole. 9.6 The author further maintains that the distinc­ tion between formal punishment, which is administered through the courts, and informal punishment which is used extensively in a wide variety of interpersonal and institutional contexts, misses the point of this com­ munication. The penalty here at issue clearly entails "punishment for crime". The distinction does not de­ pend on the agency that administers or imposes the penalty. The nature of the penalty, its relation to the of­ fence, and hs consequences are the critical factors, not the agency that imposes it. 9.7 Forfeiture of parole, when in effect, was a lawful automatic consequence by operation of law of conviction of an indictable offence in certain cir­ cumstances, but this perse is not the subject of the com­ plaint. The author states that he would have no com­ plaint under article 15 (1) about the forfeiture of his parole or the consequence of forfeiture of parole, as they applied to him, if the amendments of 1977 had not made lighter the penalty for breach of conditions of parole without making the amendment retroactive. 9.3 The author maintains in his submission that the word "penalty" is not confined to a "criminal penahy", as defined by the State party, and is consistent not only with the language of article 15(1) but also with judicial and other usage in the Enghsh-speaking world. 9.4 The penalty of forfeiture or revocation of parole, he states, is an integral part of the penal process resulting from conviction and imposition of a sentence of imprisonment and enforced by the agencies executing that sentence. The Penitentiary Service, the National Parole Board and the National Parole Service are all under the jurisdiction of the Solicitor-General of Canada, and the Penitentiary Service and the National Parole Service are branches of the Correctional Service of Canada, under the jurisdiction and administrative 9.8 Commenting on the State party's submissions as to the process of sentencing and the alleged flexibility both before and after the amendments of 1977, the author refers to statistics showing that despite the max­ imum fixed by law at 14 years, his last sentence, which was a prison term of three years, is close to the normal 120