9.2 (a) In this respect the Committee notes that in the case of the 17 unmarried co-authors there is no ques­ tion of actual interference with, or failure to ensure equal protection by the law to any family. Furthermore there is no evidence that any of them is actually facing a personal risk of being thus affected in the enjoyment of this or any other rights set forth in the Covenant by the laws complained against. In particular it cannot be said that their right to marry under article 23 (2) or the right to equality of spouses under article 23 (4) are affected by such laws. 9.2 (b) 1 The Committee wiU next examine that part of the communication which relates to the effect of the laws of 1977 on the family life of the three married women. 9.2 (b) 2 The Committee notes that several provi­ sions of the Covenant are applicable in this respect. For reasons which will appear below, there is no doubt that they are actually affected by these laws, even in the absence of any individual measure of implementation (for instance, by way of a denial of residence, or an order of deportation, concerning one of the husbands). Their claim to be "victims" within the meaning of the Optional Protocol has to be examined. 9.2 {b) 2 (i) 1 First, their relationships to their husbands clearly belong to the area of "family" as used in article 17 (1) of the Covenant. They are therefore protected against what that article calls "arbitrary or unlawful interference" in this area. 9.2 (ft) 2 (i) 2 The Committee takes the view that the common residence of husband and wife has to be con­ sidered as the normal behaviour of a family. Hence, and as the State party has admitted, the exclusion of a per­ son from a country where close members of his family are living can amount to an interference within the meaning of article 17. In principle, article 17 (1) apphes also when one of the spouses is an alien. Whether the ex­ istence and application of immigration laws affecting the residence of a family member is compatible with the Covenant depends on whether such interference is either "arbitrary or unlawful" as stated in article 17 (1), or conflicts in any other way with the State party's obliga­ tions under the Covenant. 9.2 (b) 2 (i) 3 In the present cases, not only the future possibihty of deportation, but the existing precarious residence situation of foreign husbands in Mauritius represents, in the opinion of the Committee, an interference by the authorities of the State party with the family life of the Mauritian wives and their husbands. The statutes in question have rendered it uncertain for the families concerned whether and for how long it will be possible for them to continue their family life by residing together in Mauritius. Moreover, as described above (para. 7.4) in one of the cases, even the delay for years, and the absence of a positive deci­ sion granting a residence permit, must be seen as a con­ siderable inconvenience, among other reasons because the granting of a work permit, and hence the possibility of the husband to contribute to supporting the family, depends on the residence permit, and because deporta­ tion without judicial review is possible at any time. 9.2 (6) 2 (i) 4 Since, however, this situation results from the legislation itself, there can be no question of regarding this interference as "unlawful" within the meaning of article 17 (1) in the present cases. It remains to be considered whether it is "arbitrary" or conflicts in any other way with the Covenant. 9.2 (6) 2 (i) 5 The protection owed to individuals in this respect is subject to the principle of equal treatment of the sexes which follows from several provisions of the Covenant. It is an obligation of the State parties under article 2 (1) generally to respect and ensure the rights of the Covenant "without distinction of any kind, such as ... (inter alia) sex", and more particularly under ar­ ticle 3 "to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment" of all these rights, as weU as under arti­ cle 26 to provide "without any discrimination" for "the equal protection of the law". 9.2 (b) 2 (i) 6 The authors who are married to foreign nationals are suffering from the adverse conse­ quences of the statutes discussed above only because they are wonien. The precarious residence status of their husbands, affecting their family hfe as described, results from the 1977 laws which do not apply the same measures of control to foreign wives. In this connection the Committee has noted that under section 16 of the Constitution of Mauritius sex is not one of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. 9.2 (b) 2 (i) 7 In these circumstances, it is not necessary for the Committee to decide in the present cases how far such or other restrictions on the residence of foreign spouses might conflict with the Covenant if applied without discrimination of any kind. 9.2 (b) 2 (i) 8 The Committee considers that it is also unnecessary to say whether the existing discrimina­ tion should be called an "arbitrary" interference with the family within the meaning of article 17. Whether or not the particular interference could as such be justified if it were applied without discrimination does not matter here. Whenever restrictions are placed on a right guaranteed by the Covenant, this has to be done without discrimination on the ground of sex. Whether the restriction in itself would be in breach of that right regarded in isolation, is not decisive in this respect. It is the enjoyment of the rights which must be secured without discrimination. Here it is sufficient, therefore, to note that in the present position an adverse distinc­ tion based on sex is made, affecting the alleged victims in their enjoyment of one of their rights. No sufficient justification for this difference has been given. The Committee must then find that there is a violation of ar­ ticles 2 (1) and 3 of the Covenant, in conjunction with article 17 (1). 9.2 (b) 2 (ii) 1 At the same time each of the couples concerned constitutes also a "family" within the mean­ ing of article 23 (1) of the Covenant, in one case at least—that of Mrs. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra—also with a child. They are therefore as such "entitled to protection by society and the State" as required by that article, which does not further describe that protection. The Committee is of the opinion that the legal protection or 70