or inequalities caused by the application of existing laws to past events, in particular as regards such matters as civil or personal status, does not have to be examined in the present case, for the reasons set out below. (6) A person ceasing to be an Indian loses the right to borrow money for housing from the Band Council (ConsoHdated Regulations of Canada, 1978, c. 949); (7) A person ceasing to be an Indian loses the right to cut timber free of dues on an Indian reserve (section 4—Indian Timber Regula­ tions, c. 961, 1978 ConsoHdated Regulations of Canada); 13.1 The Committee considers that the essence of the present complaint concerns the continuing effect of the Indian Act, in denying Sandra Lovelace legal status as an Indian, in particular because she cannot for this reason claim a legal right to reside where she wishes to, on the Tobique Reserve. This fact persists after the en­ try into force of the Covenant, and its effects have to be examined, without regard to their original cause. Among the effects referred to on behalf of the author (see para. 9.9, above), the greater number, ((1) to (8)), relate to the Indian Act and other Canadian rules in fields which do not necessarily adversely affect the en­ joyment of rights protected by the Covenant. In this respect the significant matter is her last claim, that "the major loss to a person ceasing to be an Indian is the loss of the cultural benefits of living in an Indian commun­ ity, the emotional ties to home, family, friends and neighbours, and the loss of identity". (8) A person ceasing to be an Indian loses traditional hunting and fishing rights that may exist; (9) The major loss to a person ceasing to be an Indian is the loss of the cultural benefits of living in an Indian community, the emotional ties to home, family, friends and neighbours, and the loss of iden­ tity. 10. The Human Rights Committee, in the examina­ tion of the communication before it, has to proceed from the basic fact that Sandra Lovelace married a nonIndian on 23 May 1970 and consequently lost her status as a Mahseet Indian under section 12 (1) (b) of the In­ dian Act. This provision was—and stih is—based on a distinction de jure on the ground of sex. However, neither its application to her marriage as the cause of her loss of Indian status nor its effects could at that time amount to a violation of the Covenant, because this in­ strument did not come into force for Canada until 19 August 1976. Moreover, the Committee is not com­ petent, as a rule, to examine allegations relating to events having taken place before the entry into force of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol. Therefore as regards Canada it can only consider aheged violations of human rights occurring on or after 19 August 1976. In the case of a particular individual claiming to be a victim of a violation, it cannot express its view on the law in the abstract, without regard to the date on which this law was apphed to the aheged victim. In the case of Sandra Lovelace it follows that the Committee is not competent to express any view on the original cause of her loss of Indian status, i.e. the Indian Act as applied to her at the time of her marriage in 1970. 13.2 Although a number of provisions of the Cov­ enant have been invoked by Sandra Lovelace, the Com­ mittee considers that the one which is most directly ap­ phcable to this complaint is article 27, which reads as follows: In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorhies ex­ ist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. It has to be considered whether Sandra Lovelace, because she is denied the legal right to reside on the Tobique Reserve, has by that fact been denied the right guaranteed by article 27 to persons belonging to minorities, to enjoy their own cuUure and to use their own language in community with other members of their group. 11. The Committee recognizes, however, that the situation may be different if the alleged violations, although relating to events occurring before 19 August 1976, continue, or have effects which themselves con­ stitute violations, after that date. In examining the situation of Sandra Lovelace in this respect, the Com­ mittee must have regard to ah relevant provisions of the Covenant. It has considered, in particular, the extent to which the general provisions in articles 2 and 3 as well as the rights in articles 12 (1), 17 (1), 23 (1), 24, 26 and 27, may be apphcable to the facts of her present situation. 14. The rights under article 27 of the Covenant have to be secured to "persons belonging" to the minority. At present Sandra Lovelace does not qualify as an In­ dian under Canadian legislation. However, the Indian Act deals primarily with a number of privileges which, as stated above, do not as such come within the scope of the Covenant. Protection under the Indian Act and pro­ tection under article 27 of the Covenant therefore have to be distinguished. Persons who are born and brought up on a reserve, who have kept ties with their communhy and wish to maintain these ties must normally be considered as belonging to that minority within the meaning of the Covenant. Since Sandra Lovelace is ethnically a Mahseet Indian and has only been absent from her home reserve for a few years during the ex­ istence of her marriage, she is, in the opinion of the Committee, entitled to be regarded as "belonging" to this minority and to claim the benefits of article 27 of the Covenant. The question whether these benefits have been denied to her, depends on how far they extend. 12. The Committee first observes that from 19 August 1976 Canada had undertaken under article 2(1) and (2) of the Covenant to respect and ensure to all in­ dividuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic­ tion, the rights recognized in the Covenant without distinction of any kind such as sex, and to adopt the necessary measures to give effect to these rights. Fur­ ther, under article 3, Canada undertook to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of these rights. These undertakings apply also to the position of Sandra Lovelace. The Committee considers, however, that it is not necessary for the purposes of her com­ munication to decide their extent in all respects. The full scope of the obhgation of Canada to remove the effects 86