reclusión". The Committee is inclined to beheve that "reclusión" in this context means imprisonment and not hospitalization as contended by the State party in its submission of 5 May 1981. At any rate, the State party's references to a medical report cannot be regarded as a sufficient refutation of the ahegations of mistreatment and torture. 11.4 As to the nature of the judicial proceedings against López Burgos the Committee requested the State party on 24 March 1980 to furnish copies of any court orders or decisions of relevance to the matter under consideration. The Committee notes that the State party has not submitted any court orders or deci­ sions. 11.5 The State party has also not specified in what "subversive activities" López Burgos was allegedly in­ volved or clarified how or whtn he engaged in these ac­ tivities. It would have been the duty of the State party to provide specific information in this regard, if it wanted to refute the ahegations of the author that López Burgos has been persecuted because of his involvement in the trade-union movement. The State party has not refuted the author's ahegations that López Burgos was forced to sign false testimony against himself and that this testimony was used in the trial against him. The State party has stated that López Burgos was not prevented from choosing his own legal counsel. It has not, however, refuted witness testimony indicating that López Burgos and others arrested with him, including Monica Sohño and Inés Quadros, whose parents are at­ torneys, were forced to agree to ex officio legal counsel. by virtue of article 1 of the Optional Protocol ("... in­ dividuals subject to its jurisdiction ...") or by virtue of article 2 (1) of the Covenant ("... individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction ...") from con­ sidering these ahegations, together with the claim of subsequent abduction into Uruguayan territory, in­ asmuch as these acts were perpetrated by Uruguayan agents acting on foreign soil. 12.2 The reference in article 1 of the Optional Pro­ tocol to "individuals subject to its jurisdiction" does not affect the above conclusion because the reference in that article is not to the place where the violation occur­ red, but rather to the relationship between the in­ dividual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they oc­ curred. 12.3 Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obliga­ tion upon a State party to respect and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction", but it does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the ac­ quiescence of the Government of that State or in op­ position to it. According to article 5 (1) of the Cov­ enant: Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or per­ form any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant. In hue with this, it would be unconscionable to so inter­ pret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which viola­ tions it could not perpetrate on its own territory. 11.6 The Committee has considered whether acts and treatment, which are prima facie not in conformity with the Covenant, could for any reasons be justified under the Covenant in the circumstances of the case. The Government of Uruguay has referred to provisions, in Uruguayan law, of "prompt security measures". However, the Covenant (art. 4) does not allow national measures derogating from any of its provisions except in strictly defined circumstances, and the Government has not made any submissions of fact or law in relation thereto. Moreover, some of the facts referred to above raise issues under provisions from which the Covenant does not ahow any derogation under any circumstances. 13. The Human Rights Committee, acting under ar­ ticle 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is of the view that the communication discloses violations of the Covenant, in particular of: Article 7, because of the treatment (including torture) suffered by López Burgos at the hands of Uruguayan mihtary officers in the period from July to October 1976 both in Argentina and Uruguay; Article 9 (1), because the act of abduction into Uruguayan territory constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention; Article 9 (3), because López Burgos was not brought to trial within a reasonable time; Article 14 (3) (d), because López Burgos was forced to accept Colonel Mario Rodriguez as his legal counsel; Article 14 (3) (g), because López Burgos was compeUed to sign a statement incriminating himself; Article 22 (1) in conjunction with article 19 (1) and (2), because López Burgos has suffered persecution for his trade union activities. 14. The Committee, accordingly, is of the view that the State party is under an obligation, pursuant to ar­ ticle 2 (3) of the Covenant, to provide effective remedies 11.7 The Human Rights Committee notes that if the sentence of López Burgos ran from the purported date of arrest on 23 October 1976, it was due to be completed on 23 April 1981, on which date he should consequently have been released. 11.8 The Committee notes that the Austrian Government has granted López Burgos an entry visa. In this connection and pursuant to article 12 of the Cov­ enant, the Committee observes that López Burgos should be allowed to leave Uruguay, if he so wishes, and travel to Austria to join his wife, the author of this com­ munication. 12.1 The Human Rights Committee further observes that although the arrest and initial detention and mistreatment of López Burgos allegedly took place on foreign territory, the Committee is not barred either 91