Human Rights of Armed Forces Personnel It is clear from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that the concept of a “lawful restriction” under Article 11(2) does not mean that all domestic laws restricting rights will necessarily be compatible with the Convention.144 Moreover, despite the absence of an express reference to a proportionality requirement for the protected interests mentioned in Article 11(2), the Court has nonetheless approached limitations in this way.145 Restrictions on the rights encapsulated in Article 11 may be justified because of the need to ensure the political neutrality of the armed forces. This is an objective that is recognized in international human rights law and practice. Paragraph 23 of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security states that, “while providing for the individual service member’s civil rights, each state will ensure that its armed forces are politically neutral.” It is also clear that the ECHR allows restrictions on the rights of members of the armed forces designed to achieve this purpose (see Box 4.3 in “Chapter 4: National Protections for the Human Rights of Armed Forces Personnel”). In a case involving restrictions imposed in Hungary that prevented members of the armed forces, the police and security services from joining political parties and engaging in political activities, the restrictions were challenged as regards the police. The European Court of Human Rights found, however, that there was no violation of Articles 10 or 11 of the ECHR, since the restrictions pursued legitimate aims, namely the protection of national security and public safety and the prevention of disorder, and were, given the context in Hungary, necessary and 146 proportionate. Moreover, the limits imposed by Hungarian law were intended to depoliticize the police and, hence, to contribute to the consolidation and maintenance of a pluralistic democracy. Bearing in mind the important role of the police in society, the Court found the restrictions to be consistent with democratic principles, stating that: “Ultimately the police force is at the service of the State. Members of the public are therefore entitled to expect that in their dealings with the police they are confronted with politically neutral officers who are detached from the political fray.”147 The Court has applied similar principles when examining restrictions on members of the armed forces designed to prevent membership in extremist political parties, as Box 5.2 shows. 80 144 See: European Court of Human Rights, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., note 132, para. 49; and Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., note 133, paras. 88-90. See also the summary of European Court of Human Rights case law on this matter in “Chapter 4: National Protections for the Human Rights of Armed Forces Personnel”. 145 See, instead of others: European Court of Human Rights, Rekvényi v. Hungary (Application no. 25390/94, judgment of 20 May 1999), para. 49; Matelly v. France, op. cit., note 2, para. 76; and ADEFDROMIL v. France, para. 61, op. cit., note 143. 146 Ibid., Rekvényi v. Hungary, paras. 46-50. 147 Ibid., para. 41.