ANNUAL REPORT 2003 lenge to conducting credible elections is political will. Seri- Elections Programmes ous violations of election-related commitments were seen in the three South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Geor- While observation is the most visible aspect of the ODIHR's gia, and Azerbaijan. election mandate, it is just one part of a broad, integrated work plan that also includes technical-assistance projects In Armenia, an amended Electoral Code provided the basis and legislative review. Activities in 2003 concentrated on the for the conduct of elections in compliance with OSCE com- following areas: mitments and other international standards. However, during both the presidential and parliamentary elections, the
Election observation authorities failed to implement the Code with sufficient po-
Technical assistance litical determination to meet these commitments and failed
Development of a progress report on to hold accountable those who violated the law. In Azerbaijan, the presidential election was marred by serious short- commitments for democratic elections in OSCE comings, including widespread intimidation; unfair condi- participating States
Further development of the ODIHR's tions for opposition candidates; biased media coverage; methodology for observing elections serious irregularities in voting, counting, and tabulation; and
Follow-up post-election violence, leading the ODIHR to conclude that the election was a “missed opportunity for a credible democratic process”. Similar findings characterized the parliamentary elections in Georgia, after which the ODIHR concluded 1. Election observation that the authorities “lacked political will to conduct a genuine democratic process”. The ODIHR was established in 1991 as the Office for Free Elections; thus, its election observation mandate has always While generally well administered at the technical level, the been at the forefront of its activities. In the early years of its December parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation establishment, however, the ODIHR could deploy only one or raised concern by failing to provide a clear separation be- two experts per election, who focused mainly on election- tween state administrative resources and political-party day findings. The expanded mandate received by the ODIHR structures. Furthermore, the election campaign was distort- in 1994 for election observation before, during, and after ed due to a serious imbalance in the media campaign in election day was recognition that an informed assessment of favour of the pro-presidential forces. an electoral process cannot be formed on the basis of election-day observations only. In Moldova, significant shortcomings during the campaign, including allegations of widespread abuse of power by the Since 1996, the ODIHR has implemented its methodology authorities, were a source of concern. In Serbia, a fourth for long-term election observation and has observed more failed presidential election once again demonstrated the ne- than 150 elections or referenda. During this period, ODIHR cessity for election law reform. In Albania, the positive work election observation missions have not only served to as- of a bipartisan parliamentary committee in consensually sess whether elections were held in line with OSCE com- agreeing improvements to election legislation and administration was devalued by an electoral process that was again mitments but have also served to mitigate crises and have protracted and litigious. On a positive note, the parliamen- been a stabilizing factor in some sensitive and highly con- tary elections in Croatia were conducted generally in line tested elections. with OSCE commitments for democratic elections. 9