Tools of Torture and Repression in South America reports. Virtually all states already control the transfer and use of firearms and related ammunition and some states already use conventional arms control lists which include certain chemical irritants, projectiles and their launchers and armoured vehicles. However, some of the law enforcement equipment mentioned in this report is not covered by these lists (for example, PAVA or OC— commonly found in ‘pepper sprays’–, restraints and electric shock devices) and states should ensure that laws are in place to regulate their trade. Argentina is a participating state in the Wassenaar Arrangement, meaning certain chemical irritants (including CS, CR and CN) and their means of delivery are subject to controls. Argentinian law actually goes beyond this by controlling electric shock weapons and sprays containing under 500ml of any aggressive chemical irritant.234 Unfortunately, the Argentinian authorities have not responded to Omega’s requests for information on their interpretation of their laws and implementation of controls.235 V.II CONTROLLING LICENSED PRODUCTION Licensed production overseas is of particular concern in relation to irresponsible weapons proliferation as it involves the establishment of new centres of production and the spread of technology over which the licensor’s government may have little or no control.236 Omega has examined what controls the Spanish Government has over the illustrative examples of licensed production agreements mentioned in Section III (above see pages 36-37). Analysis of Spanish Government control of licensed production agreements Falken-FAME: This joint venture agreement covered both licensed production of law enforcement equipment to be sold in Peru and internationally, as well as technology transfer. According to the agreement, 75% of profits from national sales were to go to Falken, with 25% going to FAME, and Falken was to be entitled to 90% of profits from international sales.237 In addition to potential issues regarding domestic use, the level of autonomy FAME has and the apparent absence of any reference to human rights in the legal instruments governing the company’s activities (see page 53) give rise to concerns regarding a potential lack of mechanisms aimed at preventing irresponsible export of law enforcement equipment. Given the involvement of a Spanish company and the fact that the majority of profits would go to Spain, it is incumbent on the Spanish authorities to ensure adequate controls are in place. The contract between FAME and Falken makes no mention of any Spanish State requirements which would need to be met in order to export equipment produced under this agreement from Peru. Falken-CAVIM: In March 2014, 13 licenses for the export of riot control equipment to Venezuela were suspended by the Spanish Government due to the ‘situation of internal instability and risk of deviation of use’.238 These licenses had been awarded for the export of 234 Article 5 of Decreto 395/75. Omega sent communications to the National Arms Registry (RENAR), DGFM and an Argentinian Foreign Ministry official. 236 For further discussion of licensed production agreements, see Omega Research Foundation, Undermining Global Security: the European Union’s arms exports, 2004, pp. 32-39; UK Working Group on Arms, Submission: 2007 review of the UK Export Control Act, 28 September 2007, pp. 20-24. 237 IDL Reporteros, Convenio FAME Falken, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/257191855/Convenio-Fame-Falken> [accessed 1 June 2016]. 238 Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, ‘Estadísticas españolas de exportación de material de defensa, de otro material y de productos y tecnologías de doble uso, año 2014. Anexo II. Estadísticas de exportación de otro 235 53