59 Conclusions and recommendations 1. International human rights law prohibits reliance on evidence obtained as a result of torture. This rule plays a key part in the overall legal architecture which underpins the absolute prohibition on torture. Reliance on ‘torture evidence’ is prohibited because: (a) it is involuntary, inherently unreliable and violates the right to a fair trial; (b) to rely on such evidence undermines the rights of the torture victim; (c) it indirectly legitimises torture and in so doing taints the justice system; and (d) prohibiting reliance on the fruits of torture acts as a form of deterrence and prevention. We recommend that domestic legal regimes be reviewed to ensure compliance with existing international standards on the exclusion of ‘torture evidence’. This should, for example, form a part of country reviews by relevant treaty monitoring bodies. Where states fail to remedy shortfalls in protection this should become a focus for advocacy, including by domestic civil society actors. 3. Given its crucial role in the prohibition on torture, the exclusionary rule should be accorded a more prominent role in the work undertaken to combat torture. In particular, we would urge the UN Committee Against Torture to produce a general comment on the topic. 2. Despite this clear legal obligation, some countries do not prohibit reliance on ‘torture evidence’ at all. More commonly, countries have some form of exclusionary rule but this is incomplete and fails to meet the key components of the rule as defined by international law: i) ii) Some countries do not have an absolute prohibition on reliance on ‘torture evidence’: frequently, countries require the courts to carry out a balancing act when deciding whether to admit unlawfullyobtained evidence, even in circumstances where that evidence is obtained as a result of torture. A number of countries prohibit reliance on statements obtained from the torture of the defendant, i.e. a confession obtained as a result of torture. However, it is quite common for exclusionary regimes not to extend to evidence obtained from the torture of a third party, i.e. when a person (who is not the defendant) is tortured and, as a result, implicates the defendant. There are two areas in particular on which international standards do not provide clear guidance as to the scope of the exclusionary rule. This is reflected in (and perhaps results from) varying approaches in domestic law: i) There is confusion about the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence indirectly derived from torture, i.e. physical evidence located due to a statement made as a result of torture. Although some countries do have blanket prohibitions on relying on such evidence, most apply a range of considerations to determine whether this kind of derivative evidence should be excluded. ii) There is also a lack of clarity about the extent to which the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained as a result of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Clarity is needed on the extent to which the exclusionary rule covers derivative evidence and evidence obtained as a result of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (as opposed to ‘torture’). This should be the focus of further research and we urge the UN Committee Against Torture to address these issues in a general comment. 4. In addition to having appropriate domestic laws requiring the exclusion of ‘torture evidence’, states must provide a fair and effective procedure to apply those laws in practice. Variations in countries’ criminal procedures make it unworkable to develop a ‘one size fits