CAT/C/34/D/233/2003** Page 33 performed the 2004 surgery and may require further surgery. Concerning the proposed international investigation, counsel argues that the only reason for Egypt’s refusal to cooperate lies in its breach of the guarantees provided. 12.34 Counsel rejects the State party’s reasons for concealing part of the initial Ambassadorial report from the Committee, arguing that they can only be relevant to protect the complainant from Egyptian reprisals concerning his outspokenness as to the torture suffered. The complainant’s statement was made in the presence of the prison warden and other officials, and the Ambassador raised the issue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In any event, having already endured reprisals, there was nothing left for the State party to protect against in withholding information. Mistreatment of the author was already in the public domain through the complainant’s mother and Amnesty International shortly after January 2002. Counsel argues that the State party’s position also reflects “weak confidence” in the integrity of the Egyptian guarantees. Counsel also questions how national security could be affected by public knowledge of the complainant’s allegations. In sum, the only plausible reason to conceal the information was to avoid inconvenience and embarrassment on the part of the State party. 12.35 Concerning his transmittal of information supplied in the context of the article 22 process to non-governmental organisations, counsel argues that at the time he saw no obstacle to doing so, neither the Convention nor the Committee’s Rules proscribing, in his view, such a course. He did not intend to disseminate the information to the media or the broader public. Following the Committee’s advice that complaint information was confidential, counsel argues his capacity to defend the complainant was significantly reduced, particularly given the disparity of resources available to the State party. In any event, the State party has shared other confidential intelligence information with the Committee, belaying its concerns that sensitive information would be inappropriately disseminated. Counsel argues that the conduct described is, contrary to the Ambassador’s characterisation, torture as understood by the Committee, bearing in mind that the complainant may have been reluctant to disclose the totality of circumstances to the Ambassador and that more severe elements emerged through the testimony of his mother. 12.36 With respect to the European Court’s decision in Mamatkulov et al., counsel seeks to distinguish the instant case. He emphasises however that in both cases the speed with which the removal was undertaken denied an effective exercise of a complaint mechanism, a circumstances that for the European Court disclosed a violation of article 34 of the European Convention. In counsel’s view, the Mamatkulov Court was unable to find a violation of article 3 of the European Convention as, in contrast to the present case, there was insufficient evidence before the Court. A further distinction is that the treatment at the point of expulsion clearly pointed, in the current case, to the future risk of torture. Given the prophylactic purpose of article 3, it cannot be correct that an expelling State simply transfers, through the vehicle of diplomatic assurances, responsibility for an expellee’s condition to the receiving State. 12.37 Finally, counsel supplies to the Committee a report, dated 15 April2005, by Human Rights Watch, entitled “Still at Risk : Diplomatic Assurances no Safeguard against Torture”, surveying the contemporary case law and experiences of diplomatic assurances and concluding that the latter are not effective instruments of risk mitigation in an article 3 context. Concerning the current case, Human Rights Watch argues that “there is credible, and in some instances overwhelming, evidence that the assurances were breached” (at 59).