CAT/C/34/D/233/2003** Page 6 2.9 In December 2002, the complainant’s Egyptian lawyer, Mr. Hafeez Abu Saada, the head of an Egyptian human rights organization with knowledge of local conditions of detention and interrogation methods, met in Cairo with Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, head of the Olaf Palme International Centre. Mr. Abu Saada expressed his belief that the complainant had been subjected to torture. 2.10 On 5 March 2003, the Swedish Ambassador met the complainant with a human rights envoy from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The complainant allegedly stated for the first time that he had been subjected to torture. In response to the question as to why he had not mentioned this before, he allegedly responded, “It does no longer matter what I say, I will nevertheless be treated the same way”. The complaint 3.1 Counsel claims that the reason that he lodged the complainant over one and a half years after the complainant’s removal was that for a long period it was uncertain who was able to represent him. Counsel contends that the original intention had been for lawyer who had represented the complainant in domestic proceedings in Sweden to submit the complaint; “due to the circumstances”, that lawyer found himself “unable to fulfill the commission” and transferred the case to present counsel “some months ago”. Counsel adds that it had been difficult to obtain the complainant’s personal consent to lodge a complaint. 3.2 As to the merits, counsel argues that the complainant’s removal to Egypt by Sweden violated his right under article 3 of the Convention. He bases this proposition both on what was known at the time the complainant was expelled, as viewed in the light of subsequent events. He contends that it has been satisfactorily established that the complainant was in fact subjected to torture after his return. 3.3 Counsel argues that torture is a frequently used method of interrogation and punishment in Egypt, particularly in connection with political and security matters, and that accordingly the complainant, accused of serious political acts, was at substantial risk of torture. In counsel’s view, the State party must have been aware of this risk and as a result sought to obtain a guarantee that his human rights would be respected. Counsel emphasizes, however, that no arrangements had been made prior to expulsion as to how the guarantees in question would be implemented after the complainant’s return to Egypt. Counsel refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal v. United Kingdom, 4 where the Court found a guarantee provided by the Indian government to be, of its own, insufficient protection against human rights violations. 3.4 Subsequent events are said to bear out this view. Firstly, Amnesty International expressed concerns about the complainant’s situation in communiqués dated 19 and 20 December 2001, 10, 22 January, and 1 February 2002. Secondly, the conclusions drawn by the State party as a result of its visits should be discounted because the y took place in circumstances which were deficient. In particular, the visits were short, took place in a prison which is not the one where the complainant was actually detained, were not conducted in private and without the presence of any medical practitioners or experts. Thirdly, independent evidence tends to corroborate that torture did occur. Weight should be attached to the complainant’s parents’ testimony as, although supervised, not every word was recorded as it 4 Judgment of 15 November 1996.