CCPR/C/125/D/3041/2017 through different procedures and their subsequent deportation before the claims of the other family members have been determined. The Committee recalls its case law, according to which there may be cases in which a State party’s refusal to allow one member of a family to remain in its territory would involve interference in that person’s family life. However, the mere fact that certain members of the family are entitled to remain in the territory of a State party does not necessarily mean that requiring other members of the family to leave involves such interference.12 7.7 In the present case, the Committee considers that to issue a deportation order against the author and her two eldest children but not her other minor children and her husband, father of the children, constitutes interference with the family, 13 within the meaning of article 17 of the Covenant. The Committee has to determine whether such interference in the author’s and her children’s family life is arbitrary or unlawful pursuant to article 17 (1) of the Covenant, and thus whether insufficient protection has been afforded to her family and to her children by the State in accordance with articles 23 (1) and 24 (1). 7.8 The Committee recalls that the notion of arbitrariness includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. 14 The Committee also recalls that, in cases where one part of a family must leave the territory of the State party while the other part would be entitled to remain, the relevant criteria for assessing whether or not the specific interference in family life can be objectively justified must be considered in the light, on the one hand, of the significance of the State party’s reasons for the removal of the person concerned and, on the other hand, of the degree of hardship the family and its members would encounter as a consequence of such removal. 15 8. In the present case, the Committee observes that the author’s removal pursued a legitimate objective, which is the enforcement of the State party’s immigration law; the State party explained that the reason for removing the author was the denial of her preremoval risk assessment. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that it has thoroughly examined the author’s claims regarding the hardship that the separation of the family could cause in the context of the author’s deferral application, and that the Canada Border Services Agency officer highlighted that the separation would be only temporarily, until the author’s husband claim for protection is decided upon. The State party submits that, after this decision, they will be able to reunite either in Canada or in Angola, where the authors have lived for years. In the particular circumstances, the Committee considers that the author’s personal family situation has been thoroughly assessed by the competent authorities and that it has found that the degree of hardship the family and its members would encounter is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Committee therefore considers that the interference in the author’s family life that has occurred is not arbitrary within the meaning of article 17 of the Covenant. Similarly, the Committee finds that the degree of hardship that may be caused by the execution of the deportation order is proportionate to the legitimate objective of enforcing the State party’s immigration law and is not arbitrary within the meaning of article 17 of the Covenant. The Committee concludes that the facts before it do not reveal a violation of articles 17 (1), 23 (1) and 24 (1) of the Covenant.16 9. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it do not permit it to conclude that the author’s expulsion to Angola would, if implemented, violate the author’s rights under articles 6 (1), 7, 17 and 23 and 24 (1) of the Covenant or those of her children. 12 13 14 15 16 12 See, for example Dauphin v. Canada (CCPR/C/96/D/1792/2008), para. 8.1, Winata v. Australia (CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000), para. 7.1; Madafferi v. Australia (CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001), para. 9.7 and Byahuranga v. Denmark (CCPR/C/82/D/1222/2003), para. 11.5. See Madafferi v. Australia, para. 9.8. See the Committee’s general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 12. See Madafferi v. Australia, para. 9.8. See M.G.C. v. Australia (CCPR/C/113/D/1875/2009), para. 11.19.