CCPR/C/125/D/3041/2017 3.3 The author claims that, by applying the Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement, she and her children have been denied the opportunity to apply for refugee status in Canada, and they have not been given an oral hearing. They have only been able to have a pre-removal risk assessment, which does not have all due procedural guarantees. The author claims that this amounts to a violation of article 13 of the Covenant. 3.4 The author claims that she and her children have strong family ties, and that the deportation of part of the family interferes with their family rights. She also claims that the two children on whose behalf she presents the communication have been going to school in Canada since they entered the country and have integrated into Canadian society; their removal would consequently have a major impact on them and would not be in their best interests. For these reasons, the author claims that her deportation with her two elder children would amount to a violation of articles 17 (1), 23 (1) and 24 (1) of the Covenant. State party’s observations on admissibility and merits 4.1 By note verbale of 4 May 2018, the State party provided its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. It submits that the communication is inadmissible owing to lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of substantiation, and because the communication constitutes, in essence, an appeal against a decision made by the domestic authorities. 4.2 The State party notes that the author has presented no new evidence that she is personally at risk. Rather, her communication is largely based on complaints about the decisions rendered by the domestic bodies that have considered her case. The substance of the author’s communication is an appeal against the domestic decisions finding her not to be at risk of persecution if returned to Angola. In this regard, Canada recalls the Committee’s consistent jurisprudence that it is not for the Committee to review the decisions of domestic authorities on the evaluation of facts and evidence in a case unless the evaluation is manifestly arbitrary or amounts to a denial of justice. Claims involving the re-evaluation of facts and evidence should be declared inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.1 The State party considers that the author has not demonstrated that the evaluation of her case by domestic authorities has been manifestly arbitrary or amounts to a denial of justice. 4.3 The State party further submits that the author has not sufficiently substantiated her allegations of violation of articles 6 (1), 7 and 9 because she is completely devoid of credibility, and she has not established even such basic elements as her identity or that she is a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Originally, the communication affirmed that the author travelled with false Angolan travel documents, while her passport was authentic. The author also made contradictory declarations regarding her nationality, and the documentation provided contains various inconsistencies; for instance, the birth certificate provided during the author’s first entry to Canada had her married name. Domestic authorities also found that the author lacked common knowledge about the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such as what a “post-nom”2 was, concluding she was not a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The author has repeatedly used fraudulent documents and false identities. She has repeatedly and knowingly provided false information. She has claimed that her husband is deceased, has given various dates of birth, and has used at least four names (K.D., D.K.M., N.B.M. and B.N.M.K.). The State party adds that the communication to the Committee is based on false statements, and appends documents in support – such as the psychological report appended to her communication – 1 2 4 See Contreras v. Canada (CCPR/C/119/D/2613/2015), para. 8.7; A.B. v. Canada (CCPR/C/117/D/2387/2014), para. 8.3; Tarlue v. Canada (CCPR/C/95/D/1551/2007), para. 7.4; Surinder Kaur v. Canada (CCPR/C/94/D/1455/2006), para. 7.3; Tadman and Prentice v. Canada (CCPR/C/93/D/1481/2006), para.7.3; Pham v. Canada (CCPR/C/93/D/1534/2006), para. 7.4; Kibale v. Canada (CCPR/C/93/D/1562/2007), para. 6.4; and P.K. v. Canada (CCPR/C/89/D/1234/2003), para. 7.3. The use of a “post-nom” – the name of one or more ancestors – was a legal requirement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: see Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem, “De l’authenticité à la libération : se prénommer et République démocratique du Congo”, Politique africaine, No. 72, December 1998, p. 103.