the light of the Committee’s views. While incorporation of the Covenant would not be incompatible with United Kingdom law, it would represent a major change in the country’s constitutional arrangements. Since such a highly complex exercise would involve an essentially political decision, based on a close examination of the ways in which existing United Kingdom law fulfilled the country’s obligations under the Covenant, it was unlikely that any decision would be taken in the immediate future. Difference6 in the law a6 it applied in various part6 of the United Kingdom reflected long-standing tradition6 to which people in the regions attached great importance and there was no need to move towards a completely unified sy6tem when the different approaches were equally compatible with the United Kingdom’6 international ObligatiOn6. 358. The Government considered that obligation6 undertaken under the European Convention on Human Right6 were not regarded a6 a conclusive argument for not ratifying the Optional Protocol and that the Covenant differed from the European Convention in certain substantive reSpeCt6. It had, however, no current plans to become a party to the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, The inhabitants of most of the dependent territories could resort to the same regional procedures for the protection of human rights as were available to The only Territories in which the the inhabitant6 of the United Kingdom. Covenant, but not the European Convention, applied were Pitcairn and Hong Kong. In regard to the latter, the Government wa6 concentrating on implementation of the Joint Declaration and the Bill of Rights. Procedure6 under sections 39 (2) and 41 of the Constitution of the Cayman Island6 were applied very rarely, since the greatest care was taken to en6ure that bills were compatible with treaty obligations. 359. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United Kingdom’6 forces had been deployed alongside those of other member6 of the international coalition in response to an appeal made by countries of the region for assistance in the defence of their territory. Such assistance had been rendered in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the Government rejected most firmly any suggestion that the use of force by the coalition had been excessive. 360. Reservations to various provision6 of the Covenant were kept under constant review and, with the exception of the reservation in respect of article 25 concerning the Isle of Man, would all be retained. The Government’s declaration in connection with article 1 of the Covenant did not constitute a reservation and had been made at a time when the right of self-determination was less clearly defined than was now the case. It merely stated that in the event of a conflict between the United Kingdom’6 obligation6 under article 1 of the Covenant and those of the Charter, the latter would prevail. If a decision was taken to remove a particular reservation in respect of Hong Kong the United Kingdom Government would have to consider the implication6 for the Joint Declaration and the need to ensure the continuity of the relevant obligations after 1997. 361. Referring to other question6 relating to Bong Kong, the representative explained that the Basic Law was on the whole consistent with the basic principles enshrined in the Joint Declaration and corresponded with the Government’s intention to secure the continued application of the Covenant beyond 1991. Furthermore, both the Joint Declaration and article 39 of the Basic Law Provided that the Covenant would remain in force after 1997. The -88-