CAT/C/68/D/863/2018 days. The complainant stated that she had been arrested thereafter, when she had returned home to collect items for her children. In contrast, the Committee observes that in her communication, the complainant states that she was hiding under a bed in an adjacent room in her home when her husband was arrested, and was discovered and arrested as soon as her husband was taken from the home. The Committee also notes that before the domestic authorities, the complainant was unable to adequately describe the prison where she claimed to have been held for four years, did not know whether the guards at the prison were armed, and was unable to explain how her friend knew where the complainant was being held and how the friend managed to arrange for the complainant’s escape from prison. The Committee recalls that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected from victims of torture,13 and observes that the complainant has provided documentation indicating that she was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression in 2014. However, while observing that the complainant’s state of mental health may account for some contradictions and insufficiencies in her account to the asylum authorities, the Committee considers that it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the aforementioned gaps and inconsistencies, which concern core elements of her account. 8.9 Furthermore, taking into account the report issued by the Institute for Human Rights and Medical Assessment, which indicated that the complainant’s scars were consistent with her account, the Committee observes that even if it were to disregard the inconsistencies in the complainant’s account of her past experiences in Côte d’Ivoire and accept her statements as true, the complainant has not provided any information credibly indicating that she would presently be of interest to the Ivorian authorities. 14 In this regard, the Committee observes that the complainant claims to have been arbitrarily arrested in 2005 due to her husband’s association with the party of Mr. Ouattara, who has been the President of Côte d’Ivoire since 2010. The information made available to the Committee does not indicate that nine years after the alleged events occurred, the complainant would be at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to her country of origin. 8.10 With respect to the complainant’s allegations that she should not be returned to her country of origin because of the high incidence of sexual violence there, the Committee is seriously concerned by reports indicating that impunity for rape persists in Côte d’Ivoire.15 The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence in which it found that rape by State officials constituted torture.16 However, the Committee notes that although past events may be of relevance, the principal question before the Committee is whether the complainant currently runs a risk of torture if returned to Côte d’Ivoire.17 The Committee considers that the incidence of general sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire does not demonstrate that the complainant would incur a personal risk of being subjected to sexual violence if returned there at present. 8.11 The Committee recalls that the burden of proof is upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real, unless the complainant is in a situation where he or she cannot elaborate on his or her case. 18 The Committee notes the State party’s observations that the information supplied by the complainant was vague, imprecise and contradictory concerning key elements of her claims. In the light of the above considerations and on the basis of all the information submitted by the complainant and the State party, including on the general situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, the Committee considers that the complainant has not provided sufficient evidence to enable it to conclude that her forcible removal to Côte d’Ivoire would expose her to a foreseeable, present, personal and real risk of torture within the meaning of article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, her claims do not establish that the evaluation of her asylum application by the 13 14 15 16 17 18 See G.E. v. Australia (CAT/C/61/D/725/2016), para. 7.6. See H.R.E.S. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/64/D/783/2016), para. 8.9. CEDAW/C/CIV/CO/4, para. 9 (a). See, inter alia, C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden (CAT/C/37/D/279/2005), para. 7.5; and V.L. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/37/D/262/2005), para. 8.10. G.E. v. Australia (CAT/C/61/D/725/2016), para. 7.8. See the Committee’s general comment No. 4, para. 38. 11