CAT/C/32/D/148/1999 Page 13 must decide whether or not it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention that the same matter has not been, and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 5.2 The Committee notes that the fact that domestic remedies are exhausted is not contested by the State party. The State party objects to admissibility on the grounds that the complainant has not established a prima facie case of a violation of article 3, but the Committee is of the view that the compla inant has provided sufficient information in substantiation of his claim to consider his complaint on the merits. As the Committee sees no further obstacles to the admissibility of the complaint, it declares the compla int admissible and proceeds to its consideration on the merits. Consideration on the merits 6.1 The Committee must decide whether the forced return of the complainant to Sudan would violate the State party's obligation, under article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention, not to expel or return (refouler) an individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. To reach its conclusion, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim, however, is to determine whether the individual concerned would personally risk torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot