Monitor�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ing����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� pointed to������������������������������������������������������������������ a number of troubling ethical practices that appear to have been influenced by the legacy of state supremacy in criminal proceedings���������������������� , such as the greater consideration and deference ���������������������������������������������������� that������������������������������������������������ judges gave ���������������������������������������� prosecutors as compared to �������� defence lawyers. During the monitoring, prosecutors’ attitudes and actions reflected prejudgement of the defendant’s guilt. Public prosecutors have used the expression “criminal” in reference to defendants during court hearings with no reaction from the presiding judge. Judges actively engaged in prosecutorial questioning, calling the impartiality of the state into question. In some instances the inadequate protection of a defendant’s fair trial rights was attributable to the actions or inactions of defence lawyers, including substandard performance and unethical behaviour. Defence lawyers sometimes displayed of a case and/or questionable courtroom manners. Monitoring concluded that legal aid lawyers160 gave particularly poor performances compared with privately retained lawyers. However, privately contracted lawyers were also noticeably ill prepared. In several instances, lawyers contributed to prejudice against their clients by referring to them in a disrespectful manner. Despite encouraging exceptions, judges typically do not serve as guardians of the fairness of criminal proceedings. Notably judges, contrary to the Superior Council of Magistrates’ proscription of ex parte communication, allow public prosecutors or defence lawyers to enter their offices before hearings, without explanation to the opposing side. Monitoring has evidenced disrespect of the rights of non-professional trial participants. Judges often do not clearly explain the procedural rights of parties and do not take positive steps to ensure them. Judges have ignored allegations of torture and pressuring of witnesses. On occasion, judges failed to react to threats made in the courtroom against victims and witnesses. Judges consistently failed to consult witnesses and victims about rescheduling postponed hearings. On occasions judges apply, and permit public prosecutors and defence lawyers to apply, inappropriate pressure while questioning witnesses and victims. Judges ask, and permit other officials to ask, inappropriate questions about the intimate life of victims that are irrelevant to the case. Judges use, and allow others to use, improper language and make, and allow others to make, inappropriate comments toward the parties. Judges do not ensure due concentration, order and solemnity in the courtroom. The ������������������������������� rights to a fair trial are broader than the sum of the legally defined guarantees and depend on the entire conduct of the trial. The cumulative ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� effect ���������������������������������������������������������� is procedural unfairness and weakening of public trust in the judicial system.� Internationally accepted standards of judicial ethics require that judges avoid situations which reasonably might be perceived as raising doubts about their independence and impartiality. During hearings, they should act diligently and expeditiously to maintain order and they should remain patient and courteous toward all participants. In particular, judges should exercise vigilance in controlling the manner of questioning of witnesses and victims 160 Ex-officio lawyers as used in the first two TMP Reports. As stated in the present Report, the monitoring overlapped only for two months with the entry into force of the Law on State Guaranteed Legal Aid. Therefore no conclusions can be made about changes in the quality of legal aid after the entry into force of this law. 81