CCPR/C/133/D/2623/2015 Advance unedited version hearing into the abandonment of his claim or the inadmissibility hearing. The Committee further notes that the author has subsequently, once he became eligible, pursued a PRRA application and an application for judicial review before the Federal Court regarding the claims raised in his complaint before the Committee. It notes that an application for a residence permit on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate considerations does not have suspensive effect and would thus not provide an effective relief against the deportation order against the author.12 The Committee therefore finds that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present complaint. 6.4 The Committee further notes the State party’s submission that the communication is inadmissible due to being manifestly unfounded. It notes the State party’s argument that the author has not clearly stated how article 2 (3) of the Covenant would have been violated, and its argument that the author’s claims have been examined under several domestic procedures. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which the provisions of article 2 set forth a general obligation for States parties and cannot give rise, when invoked separately, to a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol.13 Accordingly, it concludes that this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.5 The Committee further notes the author’s claims that he was subjected to threats and intimidation by Canadian immigration officials while in detention and his claim that he was denied access to his counsel while in immigration detention. It however notes that the author has not provided any further specific argumentation or substantiation of these claims. It therefore finds that the author has failed to substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, his claims under articles 10 and 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant, and declares these claims inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.6 The Committee notes the author’s claims that his conversion to Christianity would put him at risk of being executed subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Iran, in violation of his rights under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. It further notes the author’s claims that he would be unable to practice his faith if deported to Iran. The Committee considers that, for the purposes of admissibility, the author has sufficiently substantiated his allegations under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Regarding the author’s claims under article 18 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that this element is inextricably linked to the his claims under article 6 and 7, and it proceeds to consider the issues raised under said article insofar as they relate to the merits of his claims under articles 6 and 7.14 6.7 In light of the above, the Committee declares the communication admissible insofar as it raises issues under articles 6 and 7 and proceeds to consideration on the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as required under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it referred to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 15 The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal16 and that there is a high threshold 12 13 14 15 16 8 Budlakoti v. Canada, (CCPR/C/122/D/2264/2013), para. 8.4. See Castañeda v. Mexico (CCPR/C/108/D/2202/2012), para. 6.8; A.P. v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/105/D/1834/2008), para. 8.5; and Peirano Basso v. Uruguay (CCPR/C/100/D/1887/2009), para. 9.4 M.N. v. Denmark, (CCPR/C/132/DR/3188/2018), para. 6.5. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. K v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.2; and X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2; Q.A. v Sweden (CCPR/C/127/D/3070/2017), para. 9.3; A.E. v Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3300/2019), para 9.3.