C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y bombing. Heaney and Mc Guinnes were cautioned by police officers in the usual terms, namely they were not required to say anything unless they wished to do so and were also informed that anything they did say would be taken down in writing and might be given in evidence against them. Mr. Heaney was then questioned about the bombing and about his presence in the house where he was arrested. He refused to answer the questions put to him. Police officers then read section 52 of the 1939 Act to him and he was requested, pursuant to that section, to give a full account of his movements and actions in the hours close to the explosion: again he refused to answer any questions. The same conduct was held by Mr McGuinness. Therefore both of them were charged with the offence of failing to account for their movements (in accordance with section 52 of the 1939 Act), convicted by the Special Criminal Court and sentenced to six months of imprisonment. Their appeal filed with the High Court was rejected and as a consequence they filed an application with the ECHR, complaining, under Article 6 of the Convention, about having been punished, through the application of section 52 of the 1939 Act, for relying on their rights to silence, against selfincrimination and to be presumed innocent during police questioning. The Court decided that there had been a violation of Article 6 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Convention, recalling its established case-law to the effect that, “although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, the rights relied on by the applicants, the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself, are generally recognized international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6. The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense the right in question is closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention”604. In the case Tirado Ortiz and Lozano Martin605 however, the Court has specified that Article 6 (2) cannot be invoked to exclude the possibility to conduct breath, blood or urine tests during the criminal investigation. Obviously, if the principle of in dubio pro reo and of presumption of innocence were extended until the extreme consequences, it would become impossible in most of the cases for the police and the prosecution to perform any investigative action, since resolving any doubtful situation in favour of the accused eventually would block the investigation. In particular the Court has stated that “The right not to incriminate one pre604 605 Ibid, § 40. Tirado Ortiz and Lozano Martin v. Spain, no.43486/98, ECHR, 22 June 1999. 129