Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt On 5 March 1770 in Boston, Massachusetts, a patrol of British soldiers was confronted by a crowd of Bostonians. The soldiers of the patrol were provoked by the crowd and fired at it, killing five people. This incident resulted in the indictment of the patrol’s leader – Captain Preston – and eight soldiers for murder. John Adams (who would go on to become the second US President) appeared for the defence in both cases. Robert Treat Paine argued for the prosecution. In Preston, the patrol’s leader was acquitted. In Wemms, six of the eight soldiers were acquitted, but the remaining two soldiers were convicted of the lesser charge of manslaughter.195 Adams, defending the British soldiers, argued in his closing arguments that “the best rule in doubtful cases, is, rather to incline to acquittal than conviction... If you doubt the prisoner’s guilt, never declare him guilty…”196 Paine agreed that jurors had to acquit if they had doubts; however, he argued that their doubts must be reasonable: If therefore in the examination of this Cause the Evidence is not sufficient to Convince you beyond reasonable Doubt of the Guilt of all or any of the Prisoners by the Benignity and Reason of the Law you will acquit them, but if the Evidence be sufficient to convince you of their Guilt beyond reasonable Doubt the Justice of the Law will require you to declare them Guilty…197 The judges’ charges to the jury were only partially preserved so it is not clear if they used the reasonable doubt language.198 Chief Justice Matthew Hale instructed the jury: “Where you are doubtful, never act; that is, if you doubt the prisoner’s guilt, never declare him guilty; this is always the rule, especially in cases of life.”199 Superior Court Justice Peter Oliver instructed the jury that “if upon the whole, ye are in any reasonable doubt of their guilt, ye must then, agreeable to the rule of law, declare them innocent.”200 Scholars suggest different interpretations of the use of the reasonable doubt language in the jury instructions in the Boston Massacre trials. In Morano’s view, to employ the reasonable doubt terminology was “to break with tradition.”201 To the contrary, Shapiro notes that the “Boston cases do not suggest that the standard was considered innovative, for both the prosecution and the bench emphasized that the accused were being tried according to traditional English usage.”202 For Whitman, the “Boston massacre trial arguments … were framed in the language Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 46-98. Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 243. Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 271. 198 Morano, p. 517. 199 Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 243. 200 Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 3, p. 309. 201 Morano, p. 518. 202 Shapiro, Doubt, p. 22. 195 196 197 42