Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the facts establishing the accused’s guilt before he or she can find the accused guilty, by the evidence viewed in the way most favourable to the accused.319 In other words, and when it comes to the acquittal, the right to presumption of innocence would be emptied of all its significance without this principle, since any doubtful situation would not be solved any more in favour of the defendant. The legal presumption that the defendant is innocent would be easily overcome by contradictory and infirm evidence presented by the prosecutor who could rely on doubtful factual reconstruction and not solid evidence to obtain a conviction. The defendant would still be presumed innocent, but such presumption would be practically ineffective. And vice versa, without the right to presumption of innocence, the principle of in dubio pro reo would be of hardly any benefit to the defendant, since the suspect should bear the burden of proving their innocence. It is, therefore, evident how the principle of presumption of innocence and the principle in dubio pro reo, i.e. the standard that the guilt shall be proven beyond reasonable doubt, are actually entwined and must work together in order to ensure full fairness of the proceedings. This principle is applied with other constitutional rights fundamental to the guaranteed due process rights – rights that are explicitly set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and other regional conventions, such as the ECHR.320 Numeric presentation of the standard of proof People, including jurors, and frequently also lawyers, tend to represent probability mathematically, by representing it as a number on a scale from 1 to 100, or as a degree of probability from 0 to 1.321 Taking into consideration that there are startling discrepancies in such representations, many surveys have been carried out in USA and in the United Kingdom in order to measure the quantitative expression of reasonable doubt.322 While the position most commonly expressed in jurisprudence is that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt requires proof higher than 90%, the research mentioned above shows that the degree of proof required by respondents is sometimes much lower. Frase & Weigend, The German Criminal Procedure Code section 261 requires the court to adjudicate each case on the basis of its “free conviction derived from the totality of the trial”. 320 The fundamental rights of the accused include the right to a fair and public hearing, ICCPR, Art. 14(1), ECHR, Art. 6(1). “If burdens and standards of proof reflect fundamental societal value determinations, as Justice Harlan [Winship, 368-375, Harlan J. concurring] has so convincingly espoused, then constitutional value, such as are embodied in the United States’ Bill of Rights and in solemnly proclaimed international treaties must have some impact.” See also Juliane Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law: Civil and Common Law Approaches With Special Reference to the American and German Legal Systems 2-9 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) (hereinafter “Kokott”), p. 27. 321 See: M. K., Dhami, On Measuring Quantitative Interpretation of Reasonable Doubt, 14 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 2008, 353-363, available at: www.psychwiki.com 322 See D. K. Kagehiro, W. C. Stanton, Legal vs. quantified definitions of standards of proof, 9Law and Human Behavior, 1985, 159-178. 319 72