C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y The understanding that, in order to decide about the existence of certain facts on the basis of indications, a larger number of logically related indications are required, was accepted in the case law of the courts of former SFRY. For example, the Supreme Court of former SFRY in its judgement from 1970 found that, “where there is no direct evidence that the defendant perpetrated the criminal offence he/she is charged with, but the facts of the case are determined on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the defendant can only be found guilty on the basis of a series of facts established on the basis of circumstantial evidence, which were undoubtedly established and are strongly and logically interrelated, so that they present a closed circle and lead, with complete certainty, to the only possible conclusion that the defendant perpetrated the criminal offence that is subject of the indictment, and that the presented evidence exclude any other possibility”.335 The Supreme Court of Croatia expressed a similar opinion in an older decision, from 1969, in which it assessed that “even in the absence of direct evidence, the defendant shall be found guilty if the interrelation of the circumstantial evidence is such that it represents the links of a chain in full harmony, and if they, in their entirety, exclude any other possibility”336. Internal and external doubt The principle of in dubio pro reo is certainly applicable to the proof of an uncertain decisive fact. For instance let us assume that, in murder case, evidence presented by the defendant casts doubt about his presence on the crime scene. It is possible that things took place as follows: the prosecutor proved that the defendant had a good motive to kill, that he was on the crime scene and close enough to stab the victim and that he had a knife, but eyewitnesses saw another man on the crime scene who had a knife too, was close enough to stab the victim and after the murder fled the crime scene; therefore it could be possible that this other man and not the suspect was the murderer. In a different case, the evidence presented by the prosecutor may not be sufficient to establish with certainty whether or not the defendant actually perpetrated the crime. For instance, the defendant was seen on the crime scene of the murder, but he was too far to stab the victim who was stabbed to death. Or, the hypothesis of the prosecution explains certain facts, but not all of the facts necessary for a guilty verdict: the prosecutor proved that the defendant had a good motive to kill, that he was on the crime scene and close enough to stab the victim, but, since the suspect was blocked by the police immediately after the murder, the prosecutor should have explained also how it was possible that no knife was found on the crime scene or in the possession of the defendant. The failure to explain such a circumstance may leave a reasonable doubt that somebody else was the killer. 335 336 Supreme Court of former SFRY, Judgment KZh. no. 38/70, 22.12.1970. Supreme Court of Croatia, Judgment KZh. no. 1744/68-6, 29.10.1969. 77