Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt cases regarding the development of the reasonable doubt standard, several seminal US Supreme Court cases framing reasonable doubt in jury instructions are discussed. This will provide the backdrop on how US Federal Circuit Courts have dealt with instructing on reasonable doubt in the absence of a settled definition. Throughout this discussion, various insightful criticisms of the courts decisions are included for contextual purposes, as well as the author’s views regarding the need to define the reasonable doubt standard. Commonwealth v. Harman (1846) and Commonwealth v. Rider (1905) One of the early examples of how reasonable doubt was used and described as a standard of proof is the 1846 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case Commonwealth v. Harman,367 which was later reviewed and clarified in Commonwealth v. Rider.368 In Harman, the Court discussed the issue of the level of doubt of an accused’s guilt that is necessary for an acquittal, stating that the doubt must be “serious and substantial,” as opposed to ��the mere possibility.”369 Harman was charged with the murder of her infant child. The Court noted that since all evidence was circumstantial, such evidence would be sufficient to instruct the jury to exclude in their mind disbelief or doubt regarding Harman’s guilt.370 The Court indicated that the disbelief or doubt that a juror has must be an “actual and not technical disbelief,” and that it will be “enough that his conscience is clear.”371 The Court concluded that “the law exacts a conviction wherever there is legal evidence to show the prisoner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence.”372 It instructed the jury that a doubt to reach an acquittal must be “serious and substantial – not the mere possibility of a doubt.”373 However, if the jury “can reconcile [the evidence] to any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, [they] may acquit.”374 The use of this discretionary language suggests that the jury may acquit, as opposed to must acquit, in the presence of an actual reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Later in 1905, in Rider, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania clarified the position taken in Harman regarding the jury’s discretion to acquit. In Rider, the instruction given to the jury at trial stated: “[i]f you have any doubt of the guilt of the defendants … on the indictments, under the testimony and the law in the case, you may give the defendants … the Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269 (1846) (hereinafter “Harman”). Commonwealth v. Rider, 29 Pa. Super. 621 (1905) (hereinafter “Rider”). Harman, at 274. 370 Harman, at 273. 371 Harman, at 273. 372 Harman, at 273 (italics in original). 373 Harman, at 274. 374 Harman, at 274 (emphasis added). 367 368 369 92