allegations of abusive treatment in detention—including being shackled in painful positions, threatened with rape, and being used as a “human mop” after he urinated on the floor during an interrogation—have led his lawyers to conclude that “Canada was more interested in helping the Americans get information from Khadr than confirming his well-being.”52 Inter-state dynamics at the diplomatic level are by their very nature delicate, and diplomats often invoke the need for “caution” and “discretion” in diplomatic representations and negotiations. As a result, serious human rights issues—even those involving the absolute prohibition against torture—are often subordinated to diplomatic concerns. For example, in the case of Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef (see section on United Kingdom below), British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed concern regarding the diplomatic fallout as a result of Home Office demands for watertight diplomatic assurances against torture and unfair trial as a quid pro quo for Youssef’s return. Blair’s Private Secretary detailed those concerns in an April 1999 letter to the Home Office stating, “[W]e are in danger of being excessive in our demands of the Egyptians…why [do] we need all the assurances proposed by the F[oreign] C[ommonwealth] O[ffice] and Home Office Legal advisers. Can we not narrow down the list of assurances we require?”53 There is also a profound lack of transparency in the process of seeking and securing assurances at diplomatic level, often in the interest of preserving foreign relations, that puts the person subject to return at a serious disadvantage in terms of challenging the adequacy and reliability of the guarantees. For example, in an October 2001 statement, a United States Department of State legal advisor argued that seeking, securing, and monitoring diplomatic assurances must be done on a strictly confidential basis, with no public or judicial scrutiny, in order not to undermine foreign relations and to reach “acceptable accommodations” with the requesting state (see section on United States below).54 52 Colin Perkel, “Canada ‘Complicit’ in Detention of Khadr,” Toronto Star, February 9, 2005. Khadr’s lawyer, Muneer Ahmad of American University in Washington, D.C., uncovered a “litany of abuses” during four days of meetings with Khadr in November 2004. Ibid. 53 Youssef v. The Home Office, High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Case No: HQ03X03052 [2004] EWHC 1884 (QB), July 30, 2004, para. 18 [online] http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j2758/youssefv-home_office.htm (retrieved March 1, 2005). 54 Written Declaration of Samuel M. Witten, Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, United States District Court for the Central District of California Southern Division, Case No. 01-cv-662-AHS, October 2001, paragraphs 11-13 [online] http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16513.pdf (retrieved March 1, 2005). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17 NO. 4(D) 20