A/60/316 article 3 of the Convention, on transferring any person to another jurisdiction where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is at risk of torture.32 B. Jurisprudence of regional human rights mechanisms 38. The Special Rapporteur would like to recall the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Soering case in which it was established that the general principle of non-refoulement falls under the general and absolute prohibition against torture as outlined in article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.33 39. In the case of Chahal v. the United Kingdom,34 not only did the Court reaffirm the obligation of non-refoulement in European human rights law, but it also established the standard that diplomatic assurances are an inadequate guarantee for returns to countries where torture is “endemic”, or a “recalcitrant and enduring problem”. The Court ruled that the return to India of a Sikh activist suspected of involvement in terrorism would violate the United Kingdom’s obligations under article 3 of the European Convention, despite the diplomatic assurances given by the Government of India. C. Diplomatic assurances 40. In November 2004, the Committee against Torture expressed its concern at the United Kingdom’s reported use of diplomatic assurances in the refoulement context in circumstances where its minimum standards for such assurances, including effective post-return monitoring arrangements and appropriate due process guarantees, were not wholly clear.35 The Committee requested that within one year, the United Kingdom provide it with details on how many cases of extradition or removal subject to receipt of diplomatic assurances or guarantees had occurred since 11 September 2001, what the State party’s minimum contents are for such assurances or guarantees and what measures of subsequent monitoring it has undertaken in such cases.36 41. In Tapia Paez v. Sweden, the Committee against Torture stated that the test of article 3 is absolute: “Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to another State, the State party is under obligation not to return the person concerned to that State. The nature of the activities in which the person concerned [is] engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a determination under article 3 of the Convention.”37 42. In May 2005, the Committee against Torture considered the case of Agiza v. Sweden38 involving the expulsion in December 2001 of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed al-Zari, on the grounds of suspected terrorist activities, from Sweden to Egypt aboard an aircraft operated by the United States. 43. The Swedish authorities relied on diplomatic assurances proffered by the Government of Egypt that neither of the suspects would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or ill-treatment and that they would be afforded the right to a fair trial. The two Governments also implemented a post-return monitoring mechanism 11