A/60/316 in the form of visits to Egypt by the Swedish authorities. However, despite these assurances, Mr. Agiza “allegedly told his mother that after the January visit further electric shocks had been applied, and that for the last ten days he had been held in solitary confinement. His hands and legs had been tied, and he had not been allowed to visit a toilet. At a following visit, he told his parents that he was still in solitary confinement but no longer bound. He was allowed to visit a toilet once a day, and the cell was cold and dark. With reference to a security officer, he was said to have asked his mother, ‘Do you know what he does to me during the nights?’ He had also been told that his wife would soon be returned to Egypt and that she and his mother would be sexually assaulted in his presence. Thereafter, the complainant’s parents visited him once a month until July 2002 and then every fortnight. According to counsel, the information available is that he is held in a two-square-metre cell, which is artificially cooled, dark and without a mattress to sleep on. His toilet visits are said to be restricted.”39 Although the Swedish authorities made 25 visits to the men, no such visit was carried out during the first five weeks, during which time they were held incommunicado. 44. The Committee held in this landmark decision that “... the State party’s expulsion of the complainant was in breach of article 3 of the Convention. The procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk.”40 45. The Agiza case is the first case of extraordinary rendition to provide us with a statement of law at the international level. In this case the diplomatic assurances procured were insufficient to protect against the manifest risk of torture and were therefore unenforceable. 46. It is the opinion of the Special Rapporteur that post-return monitoring mechanisms do little to mitigate the risk of torture and have proven ineffective in both safeguarding against torture and as a mechanism of accountability. 47. In July 2004, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, stated: “The weakness inherent in the practice of diplomatic assurances lies in the fact that where there is a need for such assurances, there is clearly an acknowledged risk of torture or ill-treatment. Due to the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, formal assurances cannot suffice where a risk nonetheless remains”.41 48. The Special Rapporteur would also like to recall the case of Maher Arar, on whose behalf the Special Rapporteur’s predecessor sent a communication on 12 August 2003.42 This case illustrates very clearly the consequences of violating the principle of non-refoulement and the inoperability of diplomatic assurances in the protection against torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 49. In September 2002, United States authorities apprehended Maher Arar, a dual Canadian-Syrian national, in transit from Tunisia through New York to Canada, where he resided. He was held for almost two weeks and then flown by United States immigration authorities to Jordan, where he was driven across the border and handed over to Syrian authorities. The transfer was carried out despite Mr. Arar’s 12