Article 1. Definition of Torture 53 conditions’162 and as a consequence, the understanding of what constitutes severe pain and suffering falling under the definition of torture has changed over time. 3.1.3  Intention 101  Article 1 requires that severe pain or suffering must be intentionally inflicted on the victim in order to qualify as torture. Purely negligent conduct, therefore, can never be considered as torture. When a detainee is, for example, forgotten by the prison guards and slowly starves to death, such conduct certainly produces severe pain and suffering, but it lacks intention and purpose and, therefore, can ‘only’ be qualified as cruel and/​or inhuman treatment. During the drafting, the United States wished to make this requirement stronger by referring to ‘deliberately and maliciously’ inflicting extremely severe pain or suffering.163 Since the US proposal was not adopted, the US Government ratified the Convention with the explicit ‘understanding’ that, ‘in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering’.164 This interpretation does, however, not seem to go beyond the requirement of intention as spelt out in the text of Article 1. 102  The intention must be directed at the conduct of inflicting severe pain or suffering as well as at the purpose to be achieved by such conduct. This follows from the clear wording of Article 1 (‘is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as’). If severe pain or suffering is inflicted, for instance, in the course of a fully justified medical treatment, such conduct cannot constitute torture as it lacks both a purpose enumerated in Article 1 and the intention in relation to such a purpose.165 103  A UK proposal that the pain must not only be inflicted intentionally, but also systematically, was not adopted by the Working Group.166 It follows that even single, isolated acts can be considered to constitute torture if they fulfil the other definition criteria.167 104  The Committee has underlined in its General Comment on Article 2 that the elements of intent and purpose do not involve a subjective inquiry into the motivation of the perpetrators, but there must rather be ‘objective determinations under the circumstances’.168 This means that there must not be direct evidence on the mental state of the perpetrator, but the conclusion that intent was given in the specific case can be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case, that demonstrate that pain and suffering was inflicted knowingly for a purpose stipulated in Article 1.169 In practice, the Committee very often simply states that a certain conduct was intentional, but it has also added—​again without any detailed explanation—​why it came to that conclusion: ‘The Committee observes that the treatment inflicted on the complainant was intentional, since it occurred while he was in the hands of agents of the State party.’170 This suggests, that when a detainee is ill-​treated at the hands of the State party, it can be inferred from 162   Tyrer v UK App no 5856/​72 (ECtHR, 25 April 1978); SRT (Nowak), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (2009) UN Doc A/​HRC/​ 10/​44, para 47; Juan Mendez, ‘Evolving Standards for Torture in International Law’ in Başoğlu (n 120) 220. 163 164   See above 2.2, § 29.   See above 2.3. 165   Burgers and Danelius (n 32) 119 speak in this respect of an ‘unintended side-​effect of the treatment’. 166 167   See above 2.2 § 29.   Burgers and Danelius (n 32) 118. 168   CAT/​C/​GC/​2 (n 88) para  9. 169  Oonna Hathaway and others, ‘Tortured Reasoning:  The Intent to Torture under International and National Law’ (2012) 52 VJIL 791. 170   EN v Burundi, No 578/​2013 (n 106) para 7.2. Zach