Article 1. Definition of Torture 69 be possible to be implemented. From the travaux préparatoires one may conclude that it was not envisaged to prevent prison sentences all together, although there is a clear international tendency to avoid them to the extent possible and have sentences as short as possible. Since in the majority of cases not all domestic and international standards will be fulfilled, one may conclude that practically there is only very rarely a scope of application for the lawful sanctions clause. 150  It has also been argued, correctly, that ‘where officials issue clear instructions aimed at creating poor and oppressive conditions of detention as a means of punishing individual prisoners, groups of prisoners, or all prisoners within a facility or a system, their actions may amount to torture and cannot be justified under the ‘lawful sanctions’ exception’.277 If there is no intent to create such conditions, there might nevertheless be a violation of Article 16 CAT. 151  Another scenario to be discussed could be solitary confinement: Sweden tried to justify solitary confinement as a temporary disciplinary measure by invoking the lawful sanctions clause. This interpretation indeed comes close to the original purpose of the lawful sanctions clause in the 1975 Declaration as it falls below the threshold of disciplinary measures prohibited by the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. If a prison ward places an inmate into solitary confinement in line with international and national standards and he or she does so with the purpose of establishing order or for the safety of the prisoner, then Article 1 does not apply. If the prison ward places the person there as a disciplinary sanction, ie for the purpose of punishment, but in line with the Mandela Rules, especially Rule 37(d), and other international and national standards, the individual is placed there nevertheless with the purpose of punishing him/​ her. If a prison ward has the intent to inflict suffering, then all elements of Article 1 are fulfilled. In fact, this might in principle be another scope of application for the lawful sanctions clause. However, as in the majority of cases not all national and international standards will be fulfilled, in practice only a very limited scope of application for the lawful sanctions clause can be envisaged. 152  Since individual intention and purpose are often not easy to prove, it has also been—​rightly—​argued that it might be easier and more effective in many cases to demonstrate that conditions of detention amount to other forms of ill-​treatment and thus a violation of Article 16.278 It is clear that also other forms of ill-​treatment are absolutely prohibited under international law—​while such a finding might not oblige a State to prosecute the responsible actors, there will be a clear legal obligation to alleviate the situation of detention for the persons affected and make sure conditions are humane and in line with Article 16. 3.4 Savings  Clause 153  Article 1(2) provides that the definition of torture is ‘without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application’. This is a typical savings clause as we find it in Article 5(2) CCPR, Article 53 ECHR, Article 29(b) ACHR, and other human rights treaties. It was introduced for the first time by Sweden in 1979 and can be found in a slightly amended version in Article 1(3) of the revised Swedish draft in 1979. Although some words have been   Ginbar (n 274) 286. 277   ibid 287. 278 Zach