70 United Nations Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol changed during the discussions, this clause did not give rise to any substantial discussions during the drafting process.279 154  Whereas Article 5(2) CCPR refers to ‘law, conventions, regulations or custom’, Article 1(2) CAT only includes ‘any international instrument or national legislation’. Customary international law, therefore, does not seem to be included in this savings clause. The reference to ‘national legislation’ means that any prohibition of torture in domestic law which goes beyond the definition of torture in Article 1(1) must be preferred to the CAT definition. This corresponds to the general rule that international human rights treaties only provide minimum standards, which may be exceeded by domestic law. 155 The term ‘international instrument’, as it is usually applied by the United Nations,280 contains both binding international treaties as well as non-​binding declarations, principles and other ‘soft law’ documents. Relevant international instruments in the field of torture are, inter alia, the UDHR, the CCPR, the CRC, the 1975 UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, as well as the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. As far as treaties are concerned, the savings clause only applies to treaties which have been ratified by the respective State party. If a State party to CAT, for example, is also a party to the CCPR, then it is prevented by the savings clause in Article 1(2) CAT from invoking the lawful sanctions clause in Article 1(1) for the justification of corporal punishment because Article 7 CCPR, according to the case law of the Human Rights Committee, prohibits any form of corporal punishment.281 But even if that State party has not ratified any other human rights treaty, the savings clause still prevents it from invoking the lawful sanctions clause as Rule 31 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners clearly prohibits corporal punishment as a disciplinary sanction, and as the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment in Article 5 UDHR must today be interpreted as including every form of corporal punishment. The savings clause is, therefore, another argument to support the finding that the lawful sanctions clause in Article 1(1) needs to be interpreted in line with international standards and cannot be applied to justify corporal punishment. 156  In its Concluding Observations on the US report, the Committee refuted the argument of the United States that the Convention is not applicable in times and in the context of armed conflict on the basis of the argument that the ‘law of armed conflict’ is the exclusive lex specialis applicable, and that the Convention’s application ‘would result in an overlap of the different treaties which would undermine the objective of eradicating torture’. The Committee concluded that the United States should recognize and ensure that the Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war, or armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction and that the application of the Convention’s provisions are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument, pursuant to paragraph 2 of its Articles 1 and 16.282 157  On the argument by the Israeli Government that the Convention is not applicable in West Bank or in the Gaza strip and that the law of armed conflict is the lex specialis   cf Boulesbaa (n 30) 37. See also above 2.2.   See eg OHCHR, ‘Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments’ (2002) UN Doc ST/​ HR/​1/​Rev.6 (Vol I, Part 1 and 2). 281   See above para 146.    282  CAT/​C/​USA/​CO/​2 (n 141) para  13. 279 280 Zach