30 United Nations Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol the only provision referring to acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which did not amount to torture, expressed the view that the provision should have been presented in a more detailed way, with a more precise definition, so that the article would have a stronger effect. To this end the delegation had proposed reproducing the provisions of other instruments which had binding force for States parties.16 The delegation, considering it possible to adopt Article 16 without a reference to Article 14, stated that it would not insist on its proposal. However, it emphasized that, if in the course of the further consideration of Article 16 some delegations again raised the question of the necessity of including a reference to Article 14 in Article 16, it would return to its proposal.17 22  There was no difficulty encountered in the drafting stage about the meaning of ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering . . .’. The wording of the alternative IAPL draft referred to ‘any conduct’. In written comments Barbados sought to change the phrase in Article III (a) from ‘such conduct’ to ‘acts of torture’.18 However there was no mention of the question in the preparatory works about whether or not an omission such as omission of food, water, or medical attention would be regarded as a prohibited act and neither is this mentioned expressis verbis in the Convention. 23  It is interesting to note that during the drafting of the UN Declaration on Torture of 1975, from which the language of Article 1 of the original Swedish draft of 1978 was borrowed, a proposal that the word ‘severe’ be deleted and that it be made clear that the Article would not apply to a penalty or punishment imposed by a judicial tribunal in accordance with law or to a disciplinary administrative action taken under the provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules, had been rejected.19 The final text of the Declaration thus defined torture as ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is . . . inflicted’. This notion of severity of pain or suffering was adopted in the original Swedish draft (‘torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is . . . inflicted’) and appeared also in the alternative IAPL draft (‘torture is any conduct by which severe pain or suffering . . . is . . . inflicted’). 24  In written comments, this point was addressed by a number of States. The United States, being of the opinion that torture is the most extreme form of acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, supported the inclusion of the notion of severity of pain or suffering, arguing that a requisite ‘intensity’ and ‘severity’ of pain or suffering was an inherent element of the offence of torture and proposing the language ‘extremely severe pain and suffering’ as an alternative to mere ‘severe’ pain and suffering as appeared in the original Swedish draft.20 At the same time they indicated that in their view, although conduct which may result in permanent impairment of physical or mental faculties may be indicative of torture, it is not an essential element of the offence. The German Democratic Republic drew attention to the fact that the wording ‘. . . act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental . . .’ could be interpreted in many ways. The   Summary Record of the thirty-​thirrd Meeting of the Commission on Human Rights (1984) UN Doc E/​ CN.4/​1984/​SR.33, 5, para 11. 17   E/​CN.4/​1984/​72 (n  14). 18   Summary by the Secretary-​General in Accordance with Resolution 18 (XXXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights’ (1979) UN Doc E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.4. 19   Report of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1975) A/​CONF.56/​10, 38, para 293. 20   E/​CN.4/​1314 (n 8) 6, para 23. 16 Zach