Article 1. Definition of Torture 31 Swiss delegation, of the opinion that no distinction should be made between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, advocated that no distinction be made as to the respective seriousness of the acts.21 25 The United Kingdom was of the opinion that the definition of torture in the original Swedish draft should be made more consistent with the definition in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and to this end suggested that the word ‘extreme’ should be substituted for the word ‘severe’.22 In the same year the ECtHR in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case had drawn a distinction between torture and inhuman and degrading treatment based primarily on a progression of severity, arguing that the distinction was necessary because a ‘special stigma’ attaches to torture. It has been suggested that the United Kingdom wanted to reaffirm the relative intensity of pain and suffering notion, presumably to preserve the perceived benefits of the decision in Ireland v United Kingdom.23 This proposal was not taken up and Article 1, with its reference to the word ‘severe’, was adopted by the Working Group prior to the thirty-​fifth session of the Commission on Human Rights. 26  Following its finalization by the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights the representative of the USSR introduced amendments to the draft resolution24 which proposed the deletion of the word ‘severe��� before ‘pain and suffering’ in the debates of the Third Committee.25 However, the final text of the Convention retained the notion of severity as it appeared in the original Swedish draft text. 27  The 1975 Declaration, the original Swedish draft, the IAPL draft, and the final text of the Convention all refer to ‘severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental’. During the drafting Portugal considered that it would be useful expressly to include a reference to the use of psychiatry for political purposes in the definition of torture26 and proposed that ‘the abuse of psychiatry with a view to prolonging the confinement of any person subjected to a measure or penalty involving deprivation of freedom shall be regarded as torture’ be added to the text of Article 1(1). While this proposal could be indicative of the types of acts which the delegations considered could in certain instances constitute mental torture, the criteria as to what constitutes ‘mental pain or suffering’, as with the concepts of torture or indeed cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, are unclear and were not debated by the Working Group. The German Democratic Republic stated that the wording could be interpreted in many ways. One delegation felt that the term ‘mental torture’ was not a clear enough term for the purpose of the criminal law of States.27 The United Kingdom went along with this, arguing that the concept was too ambiguous for national courts of States to assess, especially when dealing with the motive of   E/​CN.4/​1314  (n  8).   Summary by the Secretary-​General in Accordance with Resolution 18 (XXXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights (1979) UN Doc E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.1. 23  Sir Nigel Rodley, ‘The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law’ (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 467. 24  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  Amendments to the Annex to the Draft Resolution Contained in Document A/​C.3/​39/​L.40 (1984) UN Doc A/​C.3/​39/​L.63 and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  Amendments to the Annex to the Draft Resolution Contained in Document A/​C.3/​39/​L.40* (1984) UN Doc A/​C.3/​39/​L.64. 25   Report of the Third Committee, thirty-​ninth Session (1984) UN Doc A/​39/​708. 26   Portugal drew attention to the fact that this question was being debated by certain international bodies, most notably the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which referred explicitly to this question in recommendation 818 (1977) concerning the situation of the mentally ill. 27   Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its thirty-​fifth Session (1979) UN Doc E/​CN.4/​1347 (1979) UN Doc E/​CN.4/​WG.1/​WP.2, 39. 21 22 Zach