CAT/C/55/D/642/2014 4.2 The State party points out that the complainant lodged an application before the European Court of Human Rights in which he claimed that he would face the risk of illtreatment if returned to the Russian Federation. It maintains that his application before that Court and his complaint before the Committee refer to the same parties, the same facts and the same substantive rights.2 4.3 The State party notes that the European Court of Human Rights declared the complainant’s application inadmissible, as the application did not disclose any violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. It can therefore be assumed that the European Court declared the application inadmissible for reasons related to the substance of his application, rather than on purely procedural grounds. Accordingly, it must be considered that the European Court has examined the complainant’s application within the meaning of article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention. Should the Committee consider that the decision of the European Court is unclear, the State party invites the Committee to contact the Court in order to clarify that issue. 4.4 Should the Committee consider the complaint to be admissible under article 22 (5) (a), the State party maintains that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. Complainant’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility 5.1 On 18 March 2015, the complainant submitted his comments on the State party’s observations. He argues that the decision of the European Court of Human Rights does not constitute an examination of the same matter within the meaning of article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention against Torture. 5.2 The complainant submits that the decision of the European Court of 21 November 2014 declaring his application inadmissible does not allow the Committee against Torture to assume that the same matter has been examined by the European Court. Furthermore, the European Court decision indicated that the complainant’s application did not disclose any appearance of violation of his rights, but the European Court did not examine the merits of the case. 5.3 The complainant refers to the Human Rights Committee’s decision in communication No. 1945/2010 in which it states that “when the European Court bases a declaration of inadmissibility not solely on procedural grounds but also on reasons that include a certain consideration of the merits of the case, then the same matter should be deemed to have been ‘examined’ within the meaning of the respective reservations to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol [to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]; and it must be considered that the European Court has gone well beyond the examination of the purely formal criteria of admissibility when it declares a case inadmissible because ‘it does not reveal any violation of the rights and freedoms established in the Convention or its Protocols’. However, in the particular circumstances of this case, the limited reasoning contained in the succinct terms of the Court’s letter does not allow the [Human Rights] Committee to assume that the examination included sufficient consideration of the merits in accordance with the information provided to the Committee by both the author and the State party. Consequently, the Committee considers that there is no obstacle to its examining the present complaint under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol”. 3 Likewise, in the complainant’s case, the decision of the European 2 3 The State party refers to communications No. 305/2006, A.R.A. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 30 April 2007, paras. 6.1-6.2; and No. 140/1999, A.G. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 2 May 2000, paras. 6.2 and 7. See Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1945/2010, Achabal Puertas v. Spain, Views adopted on 27 March 2013, para. 7.3. 5