CAT/C/66/D/768/2016 complainant has not provided any additional specific information in this regard that would indicate that he would be exposed to treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention if removed to Rwanda. It therefore finds his claim in this part inadmissible as insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. 9.4 The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that extradition to Rwanda would expose him to treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention. The Committee considers that the complainant has sufficiently substantiated his claim for the purposes of admissibility. As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares this part of the communication submitted under article 3 of the Convention admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 10.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 10.2 In accordance with article 3 of the Convention, the Committee must determine whether or not there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant was in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Rwanda. The Committee observes, at the outset, that in cases in which a person has been expelled prior to the consideration of the complaint, the Committee assesses what the State party knew or should have known at the time of expulsion. Information obtained after the person’s removal is relevant only to the assessment of what the State party actually knew, or could have deduced, about the risk of torture at the time the complainant was expelled. 22 10.3 In order to determine whether or not there were substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Rwanda, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country of return. The Committee recalls that the aim of the evaluation is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. The existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country therefore does not as such constitute a sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country, and additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 23 10.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing removal, either as an individual or a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee also recalls that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.24 10.5 The Committee recalls that the burden of proof is on the complainant, who must present an arguable case – that is, must submit arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real. The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned, however, it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment of the 22 23 24 Sogi v. Canada (CAT/C/39/D/297/2006), para. 10.8; Tebourski v. France (CAT/C/38/D/300/2006), para. 8.1; Agiza v. Sweden (CAT/C/34/D/233/2003), para. 13.2; Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), para. 15.2; and L.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/63/D/488/2012), para. 11.2. See, inter alia, S.K. and others v. Sweden (CAT/C/54/D/550/2013), para. 7.3. General comment No. 4, para. 11. 11