CAT/C/66/D/757/2016 7.2 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not challenged the admissibility of the complaint on this ground. 7.3 Not having found any other obstacle to admissibility, the Committee declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the forced removal of the complainant to Côte d’Ivoire would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. This includes torture or other ill-treatment at the hands of nonState entities, including groups that are unlawfully exercising actions that inflict severe pain or suffering for purposes prohibited by the Convention, and over which the receiving State has no or only partial de facto control, or whose acts it is unable to prevent or whose impunity it is unable to counter.19 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Côte d’Ivoire. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 20 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the Committee will assess “substantial grounds” and consider the risk of torture as foreseeable, personal, present and real when the existence of credible facts relating to the risk by itself, at the time of its decision, would affect the rights of the complainant under the Convention in case of his or her deportation (para. 45). 8.5 The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that her expulsion to Côte d’Ivoire will put her at risk of female genital mutilation, in violation of article 3 of the Convention. In support of her claim, the complainant points out that her mother belongs to the Malinke tribe from the north-west of the country and that a very high percentage of women of that tribe have undergone female genital mutilation; that even though female genital mutilation is officially prohibited in Côte d’Ivoire, it is still practiced and very few perpetrators are brought to justice; and that her mother was circumcised by her extended family when she was 19 years old, after her parents had died. The complainant also argues that her mother will not be able to protect her from female genital mutilation because she suffers from severe psychiatric disorders and does not have the kind of social network in Côte d’Ivoire that would allow her to live independently with three children. 19 20 See the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, para. 30. See M.S. v. Denmark (CAT/C/55/D/571/2013), para. 7.3. 9