CAT/OP/HUN/R.2 of the recommendations, with a view to implementing the NPM’s recommendations. Following the transmittal of the report, the mechanism should develop a strategy for following up on the recommendations and using the report as a platform for dialogue with the authorities of the place of detention visited as well as with the respective state or other authorities. 42. The Subcommittee also recommends that the mechanism meet with the relevant public authorities directly to discuss the implementation of its recommendations, in accordance with article 22 of the Optional Protocol. Finally, the mechanism should disseminate its annual reports, including by transmitting them to the Subcommittee, for the purposes set out in the Optional Protocol. Recommendations on visit methodology 43. During the joint visit to Budapest Remand Prison (Unit I), the Subcommittee was pleased to note that the NPM enjoyed full access to all facilities within the prison and had access to all information concerning numbers of detainees and conditions of detention. 44. Preparations for visits: taking into consideration that the year 2017 is dedicated to food/nutrition in the places of deprivation of liberty, the NPM shall collect overall information regarding the topic for appropriate state supervisory bodies in general and specific format before conducting the visit. This would enable the experts to understand better the situation in the place to be visited and to ensure the appropriate preparations for the visit. In case the NPM needs additional data from the administration of the place of detention they can provide the managements with the list of required information at the beginning of the visit so that all such information is ready to collect by the end of the visit or it can be sent via email. This will enable to save time on the spot for carrying out actual monitoring activities. 45. Interviews: The Subcommittee observed that during the joint visit the members of the NPM often introduced themselves as representatives of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, because the latter is more widely recognized and better known institution. This may lead to confusion about the separate mandates of each institution, by both detaining authorities and detainees. The Subcommittee also noted that the members of the mechanism were not clearly identified as such and some of them did not systematically introduce themselves to detainees as representatives from the national preventive mechanism and at times did not explicitly explain their mandate (including making a clear distinction between activities of the NPM and the Office of the Commissioner). In addition, some “exchanges of information” with detainees were conducted in the presence or in hearing distance of detention officers. 46. The Subcommittee recommends that members of the NPM, particularly the external experts, introduce themselves to the interviewees with their name and the position they occupy within the mechanism. The Subcommittee is of the view that an appropriate and complete presentation builds trust with the interviewees and facilitates communication and information sharing. In addition, the visiting team should be clearly identified as the national preventive mechanism, for example, by wearing badges or vests, and provide an information leaflet to the authorities as well as to the detainees. 47. Confidentiality and risk of reprisals: The Subcommittee reiterates that the location where the individual interviews take place should be carefully chosen to ensure that the content of the interview remains confidential and that the “do no harm” principle is applied, without exception. The interviewers should also indicate that the interviewees can report any reprisal they may face subsequent to the visit and encourage them to do so. If necessary, follow-up visits should be conducted. The Subcommittee underlines the need always to seek ways to protect those interviewed from possible reprisals, even when there appears to be little risk. The Subcommittee noted that the mechanism did not mention to the authorities of the place of detention at the final debriefing that any form of intimidation or reprisal against persons deprived of their liberty constitutes a violation of the State party’s obligation.14 48. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism always consider that there is a risk of intimidation, sanctions or reprisals, and therefore take steps to 14 8 Article 13 of the Convention and article 20 of the Optional Protocol.