CAT/C/34/D/211/2002 Page 6 humanitarian grounds, which incorporates article 3 of the Convention. He did not provide the Committee with any new or additional evidence or sufficiently substantiate that the evidence is reliable for the purposes of article 22 of the Convention. Nor did he present any cogent or convincing argument that there is real and foreseeable risk of being subjected to torture by Sri Lankan security forces upon return to Sri Lanka. 4.6 On the claim that there is a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights in Sri Lanka and that, on this basis alone, there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be in danger of being subject to torture, the State party replies that the complainant incorrectly applied article 3, paragraph 2. It refers to the Committee’s case law that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights is not sufficient on its own to meet the requirements of article 3. While the existence of such conditions may strengthen a complainant’s claim, the Committee’s jurisprudence establishes that the complainant must adduce additional evidence to show that there is something in his or her personal circumstances which contributes to a personal risk of torture if returned. 5 4.7 Accordingly, evidence of a pattern of gross violations of human rights which affects the whole population in the State concerned is insufficient on its own to establish substantial grounds. Nor is evidence of civil strife or the breakdown of law and order necessarily sufficient to show substantial grounds that the particular individual is at risk of being subjected to torture. The State party thus concludes that to the extent that the complainant relies on the incorrect test the communication should be ruled inadmissible ratione materiae as incompatible with article 22, paragraph 2, of the Convention and Rule 107, paragraph 1(d), of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure. 4.8 With respect to the current country situation, the State party accepts that in deciding whether to return a person, it must take into account all relevant factors, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2. It notes that the complainant refers to several reports as evidence that there is a widespread pattern of gross violations of human rights in Sri Lanka and argues that this situation has not changed since his departure in 1995, but argues that this material is of little value in an assessment of the current country situation since the majority of references date from 1997, 1998 and 1999. A single reference to the “Tamil Guardian” of 22 May 2002 concerns the peace agreement and provides no detailed reporting on the conduct of security forces. 4.9 The State party provides copies of relevant country situation reports. The State party concluded, having examined the reports on the internal situation within Sri Lanka, that while some risk of ill- treatment does exist due to the difficult law and order situation in some regions of Sri Lanka, the evidence does not support the view that the risk to the complainant is such as to elevate his personal risk above that 5 X, Y & Z v Sweden, Communication No 61/1996, Views adopted on 6 May 1998, at 11.1; Kisoki v Sweden, supra, at 9.2; Khan v Canada, Communication No 15/1994, Views adopted on 15 November 1994, at 12.2; X v Switzerland, Communication No 27/1995, Views adopted on 28 April 1997, at 10.3; Aemei v Switzerland,supra, at 9.3 and 9.4; Tapia Paez v Sweden, Communication No 39/1996, Views adopted on 8 May 1997, at 14.2; Tala v Sweden, supra, at 10.1. See also Vilvarajah et al. v United Kingdom, 14 EHRR 248 (judgment of 30 October 1991), at 112.