CCPR/C/132/D/3266/2018 found that the author’s account lacked the in-depth reasoning that could be expected from a person with a genuine and personal religious conviction who had decided to convert. The Agency noted, inter alia, that the complainant had been baptised at the detention centre on 12 May 2018. However, he was not able to reflect on the importance of the baptism relating to his own personal conviction as a Christian. Instead, his replies were considered to be about baptism in general. The author was also given the opportunity to expand on his thoughts regarding the risks of converting from Islam to Christianity in connection with a subsequent expulsion. Even though he was asked several questions in that regard, the Agency found that he could only reply in general terms about Christianity and not his own personal perceptions. He stated, inter alia, that he had chosen the right path, that he would recognize Jesus and that he had no regrets. In an overall assessment, the Agency concluded that the author should have been able to expand on his thoughts and feelings concerning his decision to convert in greater detail. Upon appeal, the Migration Court found that the author, during the oral hearing, had considerable difficulties recounting in any depth the internal process in his mind, which must have preceded the conversion and his choice to convert to Christianity. The Court noted that he did indeed have some knowledge about Christianity and about the Bible. However, the Court considered his account regarding his alleged Christian faith and its personal meaning to be vague and lacking in detail. The migration authorities therefore found that the author had not plausibly demonstrated that his conversion to Christianity was based on a genuine and personal religious conviction or that he would live as a Christian convert upon his return to Afghanistan. Neither was he found to have plausibly demonstrated that he risked being subjected to treatment constituting grounds for protection owing to an ascribed religious belief. The State party submits that there is no reason to conclude that the rulings by the domestic authorities were inadequate, or that the outcome of the domestic proceedings was in any way arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 5.1 On 16 April 2020, the author submitted his comments on the State party’s observations. He maintains that the communication is admissible. 5.2 The author refers to his initial submission of 19 November 2018 and maintains that his removal to Afghanistan would amount to a violation of his rights under article 7 of the Covenant. 5.3 The author submits that it is not possible to exhaust his claims under article 17 of the Covenant in the State party. First, it is impossible for him to apply for a residence permit based on his connection with his boyfriend, when the authorities refuse to believe that he has one. Second, there are no remedies available. The only extraordinary remedy would be to apply for impediment to enforcement of the deportation decision owing to a connection to a person in Sweden. However, in order for the authorities to grant a residence permit on that ground, it must be a connection such as that to a child, and even then the applicant must have an approved passport, which the author does not have. 5.4 The author reiterates the claims raised in his initial complaint. Regarding the State party’s referral to M.K.N. v. Sweden, the author notes that the circumstances in said complaint were very different from his situation. The applicant in M.K.N. v. Sweden was an adult married man with two children who wished to stay with his wife and had no intention of living as a homosexual. The author argues that in his case, his claims have been assessed with a negative bias and without a human rights perspective, with a burden of proof impossible to attain. He argues that his refugee claims were not assessed in a rational and objective manner but were biased and based on subjectivity. 5.5 The author notes the State party’s argument that his claims were not found credible as he did not invoke them until the deportation order against him had become final. He argues that this is unreasonable as he was only 16 years old when he came to Sweden. He had suffered from harassment and violence for three years in the Islamic Republic of Iran because of his sexuality. He was beaten by his family who regarded him as sick. In those circumstances, he could not be expected to invoke his sexuality at an early stage. He notes the State party’s argument that the domestic authorities found his account to be vague and that he was unable to express his feelings. He argues that it was difficult for him to talk about his sexual orientation owing to his previous experience in the Islamic Republic of Iran and 6