CCPR/C/132/D/3266/2018 Migration Court also held an oral hearing to give the author the opportunity to again describe his cited need for protection owing to sexual orientation and the Court’s finding that his claims were not credible, given, among other factors, that it had been more than two years after his arrival in Sweden and after his expulsion order had become final that he first cited that he was homosexual, while he claimed to have known the Swedish authorities’ view about homosexuality before arriving in Sweden. The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the author has not submitted any evidence in support of his claim that he has received threats from persons in Afghanistan, either before the Committee or before the domestic authorities. It also notes the State party’s argument that the author’s conversion was found to not be genuine by the domestic authorities as it took place after his expulsion order had become final, while he was being held in detention awaiting the enforcement of the expulsion order, and as his account was found to be vague and lacking in detail and personal conviction. 6.5 The Committee notes the author’s argument that the domestic authorities did not take into account his young age and cultural background in assessing his asylum claims and his claim that he initially was too ashamed to raise his claims based on his sexual orientation before the domestic authorities. It notes his argument that his claims were assessed with a negative bias by the domestic authorities and with a burden of proof impossible to attain. It also notes his argument that it was difficult for him to talk about his sexual orientation owing to his previous experience in the Islamic Republic of Iran and owing to his having grown up in a country with negative views on homosexuality. The Committee also notes his argument that the domestic authorities had failed to understand that his choice to convert was linked to his sexual orientation and his argument that he clearly expressed his reasons for converting. 6.6 The Committee recalls that, in paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, it referred to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal3 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 4 All relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.5 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists,6 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 7 6.7 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that an author carries the burden of proof to support the allegations of a personal and real risk of irreparable harm if deported, including the obligation to submit evidence sufficiently in advance of the decisions of the national domestic authorities, unless the information could not have been presented before. In the present case and as concerns the author’s claims that he would be at risk of persecution if returned to Afghanistan owing to his sexual orientation, the Committee notes that the author states that he came to the realization about his sexual orientation at a young age. It notes that he arrived in Sweden in 2015 but did not invoke his protection claims on the basis of his sexual orientation until January 2018, after the rejection of his initial application for asylum had become final and while he was in detention facing removal to Afghanistan. The Committee further notes the domestic authorities’ findings that the author’s account was 3 4 5 6 7 8 K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.2; and X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2; Q.A. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/127/D/3070/2017), para. 9.3; and A.E. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3300/2019), para. 9.3. X v. Denmark, para. 9.2; X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18; Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.3; and A.E. v. Sweden, para. 9.3. Ibid. Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4; and Z.H. v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. See, for example, K. v. Denmark, para. 7.4; Y.A.A. and F.H.M. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2681/2015), para. 7.3; Rezaifar v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2512/2014), para. 9.3; Q.A. v. Sweden, para. 9.3; and A.E. v. Sweden, para. 9.3.